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Abstract

Historically, the United States have been the meeting point for people, ideas and knowledge from all over the
world. The first two chapters of my dissertation focus on the composition and impact of the U.S. immigrants;
while the last chapter describes a new way for U.S. universities to export education worldwide, analyzing the
case of a Mass Open Online Course.
In Chapter 1, I study how visa policies may affect the immigrant distribution in terms of both observable
skills, as education, and unobservable traits, as ability or motivation. I develop a model of migration choice,
estimated via simulated method of moments using the New Immigrant Survey dataset. I find that wage
differentials, combined with skill transferability, act as the main force driving self-selection. Positive selfselection on unobservables is stronger among non-college graduates. The dynamic framework gives the
opportunity to simulate the immigrant distribution resulting from alternative visa policies. In this work, I
apply the visa-point system proposed by the RAISE Act to the model. The results suggest that the scheme is
successful in attracting migrants with the desired observable characteristics but it reduces the positive
selection on unobservable skills.
In Chapter 2, I use a firm-level database on high-skill temporary visa (H-1B) applications to study the effects
of H-1B workers on patents. To address endogeneity, I construct an instrumental variable by interacting H-1B
quotas with the number of Asian incumbent inventors within the firm. An increase in H-1B applications has a
positive impact in terms of firm patent activity, future new inventors and patent activity by incumbents. It also
leads to a higher diversity in citations by country and class, as evidence of positive spillovers.
Chapter 3 (joint with Rebecca Stein) describes our Mass Open Online Course in microeconomics principles.
Using the Cox proportional hazard model, we relate the high attrition rate to demographic data, finding that
younger students, U.S. participants and females are less likely to complete the course. The results provide
useful insights for future MOOCs: more flexibility may benefit time-constrained students but it is important
to keep the structure and sense of community, both instrumental to completion.
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the composition and impact of the U.S. immigrants; while the last chapter describes
a new way for U.S. universities to export education worldwide, analyzing the case of
a Mass Open Online Course.
In Chapter 1, I study how visa policies may affect the immigrant distribution in
terms of both observable skills, as education, and unobservable traits, as ability or
motivation. I develop a model of migration choice, estimated via simulated method
of moments using the New Immigrant Survey dataset. I find that wage differentials,
combined with skill transferability, act as the main force driving self-selection. Positive self-selection on unobservables is stronger among non-college graduates. The
dynamic framework gives the opportunity to simulate the immigrant distribution resulting from alternative visa policies. In this work, I apply the visa-point system
proposed by the RAISE Act to the model. The results suggest that the scheme is
successful in attracting migrants with the desired observable characteristics but it
reduces the positive selection on unobservable skills.
In Chapter 2, I use a firm-level database on high-skill temporary visa (H-1B)
applications to study the effects of H-1B workers on patents. To address endogeneity,
I construct an instrumental variable by interacting H-1B quotas with the number of
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Asian incumbent inventors within the firm. An increase in H-1B applications has
a positive impact in terms of firm patent activity, future new inventors and patent
activity by incumbents. It also leads to a higher diversity in citations by country and
class, as evidence of positive spillovers.
Chapter 3 (joint with Rebecca Stein) describes our Mass Open Online Course in
microeconomics principles. Using the Cox proportional hazard model, we relate the
high attrition rate to demographic data, finding that younger students, U.S. participants and females are less likely to complete the course. The results provide useful
insights for future MOOCs: more flexibility may benefit time-constrained students
but it is important to keep the structure and sense of community, both instrumental
to completion.

vii

Contents
Acknowledgements

iv

Abstract

vi

Contents

viii

List of Tables

x

List of Figures

xii

1 Immigrant Self-Selection and Visa Policies

1

1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.3

A Brief Overview of the U.S. Visa System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.4

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.5

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

1.5.1

Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

1.5.2

Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

1.6

Estimation Strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

1.7

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

1.8

Policy Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

1.8.1

Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

1.8.2

Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

1.9

viii

2 The Impact of H-1B Visa on U.S. Innovation

45

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

2.2

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

2.3

Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

2.3.1

Analysis by Assignee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

2.3.2

Analysis by Incumbent Inventor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

2.3.3

Citation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

2.4

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

2.5

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

3 Mass Attrition: An Analysis of Drop Out from Principles of Microeconomics MOOC

64

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

3.2

Model and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

3.3

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

A Appendix to Chapter 1

88

A.1 On multiple migration opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography

88
90

ix

List of Tables
1.1

Distribution of employment-based immigrants over visa categories . .

7

1.2

Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

1.3

Parameters set exogenously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

1.4

Probability of winning the diversity lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

1.5

Parameters of the home-country wage function . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

1.6

Parameters of the U.S. wage function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

1.7

Parameters of the probability of a U.S. job offer . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

1.8

Parameters of the migration cost function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

1.9

Model fit - Migrants’ distribution by origin and education . . . . . . .

34

1.10 Model fit - Share of EB migrants by origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

1.11 Share of high-type migrants by origin and education . . . . . . . . . .

35

1.12 Share of high-type migrants by origin and visa category . . . . . . . .

36

1.13 Visa point system under the RAISE Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

1.14 Policy experiment - Migrants’ distribution by origin and education . .

40

1.15 Policy experiment - Share of migrants with a job offer by origin . . .

42

1.16 Policy experiment - Share of high-type migrants by origin and education 43
2.1

Impact of H-1B workers on patents by assignee

. . . . . . . . . . . .

59

2.2

Impact of H-1B workers on the number of new inventors . . . . . . .

60

2.3

Impact of H-1B workers on incumbent inventors (extensive margin) .

61

2.4

Impact of H-1B workers on incumbent inventors (intensive margin) .

62

2.5

Impact of H-1B workers on the diversity index of citations . . . . . .

63

3.1

Statistics on course activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

x

3.2

Statistics on first-week activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

3.3

Demographic data

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

3.4

Video and quiz retention by first-week activity . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

3.5

Video and quiz retention by survey participation . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

3.6

Video retention by demographics (focus on Reasons for taking the course) 79

3.7

Video retention by demographics (focus on Age and Occupation) . . .

80

3.8

Quiz retention by demographics (focus on Age and Occupation) . . .

85

xi

List of Figures
1.1

Model fit - Migrants’ age distribution by origin . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

1.2

Model fit - Migrants’ wage distribution in their home country . . . .

32

1.3

Model fit - Migrants’ wage distribution in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . .

33

1.4

Policy experiment - Migrants’ age distribution by origin . . . . . . . .

41

xii

Chapter 1
Immigrant Self-Selection and Visa
Policies
1.1

Introduction

Every year, around 1 million foreigners are lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in the United States, obtaining what is commonly known as a ‘green card’. According
to the 2010 Census, the share of foreign born over the total U.S. population is 12.9%.
Given the relevance of the phenomenon, many studies have investigated the economic
impact of immigration (Kerr and Kerr, 2011). This has motivated U.S. policy-makers
to design visa policies more and more selective. In particular, the idea of introducing
a visa-point scheme similar to the one already applied in other countries as Canada
or Australia, has come back several times over the last twenty years. However, the
immigrant population is the combined result of two forces, out-selection and selfselection. Hence, any policy must take into account that: a) there are unobservable
characteristics, such as ability, motivation or soft skills (Heckman and Kautz, 2012),
which are difficult to control for; b) the policy itself may change the incentive to
migrate, differently for immigrants with different characteristics.
To understand the effects of a visa-point system on the composition of U.S. green
card holders, I develop a life cycle model of migration from the rest of the world to the
United States. I focus on migration for work reasons so I include in the model two of
the current U.S. visa categories: the employment preference and the diversity lottery.
In case of the employment-based visa, the foreign worker receives a job offer from
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the United States, which he can decide whether to accept or reject. For the diversity
visa, the immigrant can choose whether to apply to the lottery or not. In the model,
the acceptance of a U.S. job offer or the winning of a diversity visa implies migrating
to the United States, without the possibility of returning to their home country.
Everything being equal, the ex-ante probability of accepting a U.S. job offer is higher
than the probability of applying to the lottery because the diversity migrant enters
the United States without the certainty of being employed nor the knowledge of its
prospective wage. Foreign workers are different in terms of observable characteristics,
such as age, education or country of origin, and unobservable skills, low versus high
types.
I use the New Immigrant Survey data to estimate the model parameters through
the simulated method of moments. The survey is a micro-level dataset, collecting
present and past information among the cohort of new legal immigrants admitted
between May and November 2003. In particular, it includes retrospective questions
about wages and occupation status before leaving the home country or immediately
upon migration, in addition to a rich set of demographic, economic and social variables
about the current status. Since the migration cost depends also on variables that
do not enter the wage function, such as distance to the United States, I am able
to identify the value and distribution of unobservable skills by matching simulated
moments about home-country and U.S. wages and the probability of migrating to
their data equivalent.
Migrants coming from the OECD high-income countries, Eastern Europe and Asia
are positively selected in terms of unobservables. In particular, the proportion of high
types is larger among uneducated workers. Since they do not benefit from the gain in
the college premium, positive self-selection is stronger for them to compensate their
lower incentive to migrate. Skills, both observable and unobservable, are not perfectly
2

transferable for natives of Latin America, Africa and Middle East, so wage differentials
encourage the uneducated and low-type workers to migrate more than the others. In
the meanwhile, though, the high unemployment rates in some source countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa give to the educated high-type individuals a greater incentive to
move to the United States, counterbalancing some of the negative selection.
In order to assess the effect of a change in the visa system on the distribution of
U.S. immigrants, I run a counterfactual experiment and apply the point allocation
scheme proposed by the bill S. 1720, introduced in the Senate in 2017. The scheme is
successful in attracting mostly educated, young workers from the OECD high-income
or the East and South Asia countries. However, the overall proportion of high-type
immigrants decreases. The effect is driven by the increased share of Canadian workers among migrants. Being contiguous to the United States, their migration cost
is small and so the proportion of low types that find beneficial to migrate is larger
than in the countries sharing the same wage differentials. The proposed visa system gives additional points to highly compensated job offers but removes the need
of employer sponsorship. This particular feature, included in the counterfactual experiment, results in the vast majority of migrants entering the United States without
employment. However, in East and South Asia, where the percentage of workers
moving consequently to a U.S. job offer is the largest, the points awarded to highly
compensated job positions are effective in selecting the high types. For the remaining
regions – Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Africa and Middle East –
the probability of being admitted under this point allocation scheme is so small that,
when given the possibility of migrating, both low and high types take it, without
waiting for another opportunity. Hence, for them the positive or negative selection
on unobservables, detected in the baseline model, lessens.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a review of the related
3

literature. In Section 2, I draw a brief picture of the American visa system, with a
particular focus on the employment-based and the diversity visa categories. Section
3 describes the New Immigrant Survey dataset. The model is presented in Section
4. Section 5 explains the estimation strategy and Section 6 contains the estimation
results. Section 7 provides a description and analysis of the policy experiment. Section
8 draws some concluding remarks.

1.2

Related Literature

Since the seminal paper of Borjas (1987), there has been great interest in the topic
of migrants’ self-selection. Most of the literature builds around the Roy model, that
predicts positive selection from source countries where the rate of return to skills
is lower than in the destination country and negative selection when it is higher.
However, the evidence suggests that highly educated workers are over-represented
also in the emigrant population from less developed countries contradicting some
of the model predictions. Grogger and Hanson (2011) propose a linear utility model
where absolute wage differentials can explain positive selection from poorer countries.
Wealth constraints are another possible explanation for low migration rates among
less skilled workers, as argued by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) who find evidence
of intermediate selection among Mexican emigrants to the United States, consistent
with a negative selected distribution truncated from below. I construct a modified
Roy model in a dynamic framework, which allows me to take into account also the
option value of the migration choice (Burda, 1995; Locher, 2001). The possibility of
moving to the U.S. becomes also an insurance against future bad shocks, so workers
may choose to postpone their migration.
Most recent studies (Borjas et al., 2018; Bertoli et al., 2016) analyse self-selection
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in terms of unobservables characteristics. Borjas et al. (2018) use administrative data
from Denmark to decompose the self-selection in total earnings between observables
and unobservables. They conclude that unobservables play the dominant role and,
under certain conditions, may reverse the self-selection based only on observables. My
model can capture the same mechanism by including unobservables discrete types and
see whether it is supported by the U.S. data.
A parallel strand of the literature has studied how immigration policies affects
the self-selection of migrants. Bianchi (2013) identifies two different components: a
size effect and a composition effect, working in opposite directions. At lower levels
of restrictions, the composition effect may dominate the size effect so that increasing
the migration cost leads to higher skill distribution among migrants. Bianchi argues
that, in light of these conclusions, there may be no need for skill-dependent policies
as visa-point systems, which are difficult to tailor, but migration costs can be as much
effective in screening the migrant pool. Stark et al. (2017) compare the impact of an
entry fee versus a quota when the receiving country is interested in both the quality of
migrants and their occupation. They conclude that a differentiated entry fee induces
positive self-selection among migrants and allows to control their share by occupation. Bertoli et al. (2016) investigate how immigration policies targeting observable
characteristics may influence the immigrant composition in terms of unobservables.
In case of positive self-selection on the unobservables, increasing the selectivity of migrants on observables may lead to a decrease in their overall productivity to the point
that its better to admit an uneducated high-type migrant rather than an educated
low-type one. Through my estimated model, I can run a counterfactual experiment
with a visa-point system to study this same question empirically, not only from a
theoretical point of view.
Ortega and Peri (2013) use a dataset on annual bilateral migration flows covering
5

15 OECD destination countries and 120 sending countries for the period 1980-2006 to
establish, among other results, that migration policies do play a role in determining
the size of the flows. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) compare employment immigrants
in Australia, which applies a visa-point system, and the United States, finding that
the selection mechanism has little impact on the characteristics of skill migration.
However, the two countries attract a different pool of migrants, given their geographic
location, so my counterfactual experiment may lead to further insights. A very recent
study by Chassamboulli and Peri (2018) uses a search model in general equilibrium,
calibrated to the migrant flows between the U.S. and the rest of the world, to analyze
the economic effects of changing immigration policies. The paper studies the impact
of reducing the size of particular visa categories, shifting to others, for example from
family reunification to employment-based. Differently from my work, it does not get
into the details of the selection mechanism of work immigrants so the two studies
may be considered complementary to each other.

1.3

A Brief Overview of the U.S. Visa System

The architecture of the current U.S. immigration system is built on the Immigration Act of 1990. The act established two preference categories for permanent immigrants: family-sponsored and employment-based. Each category is subject to a worldwide limit: between 226,000 and 480,000 for family preference visas and 140,000 for
employment-based. The exact value is determined annually, depending on the number of preference visas in the previous fiscal year. There is also a per-country annual
limit, equal to 7% of the total. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject
to any numerical limitation but they contribute to the family-sponsored limit for the
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following year.1
On average, employment-based preferences count for 12% of the total number
of visas. They include 5 different categories: priority workers; professionals with
advanced degrees or of exceptional ability; skilled workers, professionals (without
advanced degrees), and needed unskilled workers; special immigrants (e.g., ministers,
religious workers, and employees of the U.S. government abroad); and investors. Table
1.1 shows the distribution of employment-based (EB) preferences across categories in
the fiscal year 2003, including accompanying spouses and children who participate to
the numerical limit. Two thirds of the EB visas are allocated to the second and third
category. In the vast majority of cases, applicants must be sponsored by their U.S.
employer, hence possessing a job offer prior to petition. Generally, a labor certification
issued by the Secretary of Labor is also needed to attest that there are not sufficient
U.S. workers available for the job position in question and that wages and working
conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers will not be negatively affected by the
employment of the foreign worker.
Table 1.1: Distribution of employment-based immigrants over visa categories

EB1
EB2
EB3
EB4
EB5

-

Priority workers
15.89%
Professionals with advanced degree or of exceptional ability 19.91%
Skilled workers, professionals, unskilled workers
56.36%
Special immigrants
7.79%
Investors
0.05%

The Act of 1990 also established the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV),
known as ‘green card lottery’, to promote immigration from underrepresented countries. To enter the lottery, applicants must have been born in an eligible country,
i.e. one with fewer than 50,000 admissions over the preceding five years, and have
1

The family preference limit is the minimum between 226,000 and 480,000 minus the previous
year’s total of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
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at least a high school degree or two years of qualifying work experience. Originally,
the number of visas allocated through the Diversity Program was 55,000 but it was
reduced to 50,000 in 1999. The visas are distributed among six geographic regions
according to a formula based on immigrant admissions during the preceding 5 years
and the total population of the region. Each country can receive up to 7% percent
of the available DVs in one year. DV winners are then randomly selected by region,
with no difference between countries belonging to the same region, except for the
aforementioned limit. Table 1.4 presents the list of countries declared ineligible for
the 2003 Lottery. The remaining visas are allocated to refugees, asylees and other
special categories which account for few admissions. In general, applicants may be
already living in the United States as temporary workers, foreign students, refugees,
or sometimes even undocumented. If so, we talk about adjustments of status to legal
permanent residence; while, for applicants living abroad we talk about new arrivals.

1.4

Data

The New Immigrant Survey (NIS) is a longitudinal dataset targeting all the immigrants admitted to the United States through a permanent visa between March and
November 2003. It includes both new arrivals and adjustments of status. For the
Adult Sample2 , 12,500 immigrants were drawn from the U.S. administrative records,
representing 4.3% of the entire population. The response rate was 68.6% for a total
of 8,573 cases. Acknowledging the research interest in studying and comparing immigrants with different visas, the sample was stratified to allow for representativeness
across the main visa categories. Four strata were defined: spouses of U.S. citizens,
2

The NIS includes also a Child Sample, covering immigrants younger than 18 who entered as
child-of-U.S.-citizen or adopted orphans under five years of age. The sample is not relevant for my
research purpose.
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employment-preference immigrants, diversity lottery winners and other immigrants.
Employment-based immigrants and diversity lottery winners were over-sampled, at
respectively two and three times their frequency, making up 16.5% and 13.5% of the
sample. Conversely, spouses of U.S. citizens were under-sampled at half their natural
rate, being 16.5% of the sample. The survey questions the new legal permanent residents about a variety of topics (family, schooling, health, earnings, etc.) but what
makes the dataset incredibly valuable in light of my research question is the information about their careers at home and in the United States. Having retrospective
data on their home country wages allows me to identify the unobserved types among
migrants and thus estimate self-selection. They were asked about:
- the first job they had in their home country (occupation, industry, hours worked,
earnings when they first started the job,...);
- the last job they had in their home country (occupation, industry, hours worked,
earnings just before they left job,...): the information was recorded only if they
had another job other than the first one;
- the first job they had in the U.S. (occupation, industry, hours worked, earnings
when they first started the job,...);
- the current job at the time of the interview (2003 and follow-up 2007).
The project comprised a follow-up interview in 2007-2009 but the response rate was
particularly low, 46.1% of the previous respondents. Nevertheless, Massey et al.
(2017) provides weights effective in correcting for the nonresponse bias, so I use the
second round data to fill the missing values for some variables of the first round (for
example, the wage of their last job at home in case it was not recorded in the first
round) and to capture the wage progression in the U.S.
9

Given that the model makes some simplifying assumptions, I need to select a
sub-sample of the available cases. First, I consider only employment-based preference
(EB) and diversity (DV) principal3 migrants, since I do not study family migration.4
I also leave out female migrants, not modeling the labor choice. The dataset includes
also the adjustments of status, so half of the sample consists of migrants who arrived
in the U.S. prior to 2003. I set the year of migration at the time of their first job in
the United States.5 As for the age span, I consider only those who migrated between
18 and 64 years. I define educated immigrants as those with at least a bachelor
degree, earned in their home country. Since I take education as exogenous, I need
to exclude all the migrants who received their bachelor degree in the United States:6
those represent 3.78% of my remaining sample.
The resulting sample counts 1,551 observations, with diversity visa slightly outnumbered by employment-based visas. Table 1.2 shows some summary statistics.
The sub-samples by visa category are very different in terms of country of origin and
education. Most DV migrants come from Eastern Europe, Central Asia and SubSaharan Africa, while the majority of EB migrants are from East and South Asia and
OECD high-income countries. The difference in provenience stems from two factors:
the ineligibility of some countries for the diversity lottery, as India or Canada, and
the different probability of getting a job offer in the United States. Latin America
3

I exclude accompanying spouses and children.
For family migration, see Gemici (2011), who estimates a dynamic model of internal migration
with intra-household bargaining using U.S. data, and Lessem (2018), who estimates a model where
the migration decision depends on the location of the spouse using survey data from the Mexican
Migration Project.
5
If sooner, I use the year of last entry where last entry stands for the last time they entered the
United States without leaving for more than 60 days.
6
The question in the survey is about the highest degree received so in case of degrees higher than
bachelor and earned in the United States, I cannot directly identify those who graduate from college
in their home country. However, I observe the number of years of schooling spent in their home
country: if higher than 16, I consider them to have received their bachelor before migrating and I
keep them in the sample.
4
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Visa category
Diversity

Employmentbased
%
%

Total
%

Country of origin
OECD high-income countries
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & South Asia
Latin America
Africa Sub-Saharan
Middle East & North Africa
Total

4.1
29.2
11.1
3.4
38.6
13.5
100.0

23.8
5.0
51.7
12.9
3.2
3.4
100.0

14.8
16.1
33.1
8.6
19.4
8.1
100.0

Highest degree received
None or lower than HSD
High School Degree
Associate Degree
Bachelor Degree
Master Degree
PhD
JD/MD
Unspecified
Total

11.3
20.0
5.8
29.3
12.3
2.1
1.7
17.5
100.0

10.7
4.0
1.8
35.6
30.3
9.0
2.3
6.3
100.0

11.0
11.3
3.6
32.8
22.1
5.9
2.0
11.4
100.0

Age at migration
18-21
22-25
26-29
30-33
34-40
41-50
51-64
Total

6.6
19.5
22.7
17.2
18.9
11.4
3.7
100.0

5.2
20.4
26.2
15.7
19.0
10.6
2.9
100.0

5.9
20.0
24.6
16.4
19.0
11.0
3.2
100.0

Arrival year
1965-1980
1981-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
2001-2004
Total

0.0
1.1
1.3
7.3
90.3
100.0

0.6
8.9
19.5
59.5
11.5
100.0

0.3
5.4
11.2
35.7
47.5
100.0

Adjustment of status
New arrival
Adjusted status
Total

92.9
7.1
100.0

21.9
78.1
100.0

54.4
45.6
100.0

709

842

1,551

N
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accounts only for 8.6% of the entire sample, in contrast with the overall statistics
where Mexico alone makes 20% of the total admissions. This comes from leaving out
family preference visas. Not surprisingly, EB migrants are on average more educated
than DV migrants: most of EB visa categories require a bachelor degree. In terms of
age distribution, there are no striking difference between the two sub-samples: half of
migrants come to the United States before thirty while arrivals after the age of 50 are
quite rare, at around 3%. As mentioned before, the sample includes both new arrivals
and adjustments of status: if the former are the vast majority of DV visas, the latter
represent almost 80% of the EB migrants, with 411 new legal permanent residents
adjusting their status from a temporary work visa. As for the arrival year, most migrants entered, permanently, the United States after 1995. For the EB sample, this is
coherent with the maximum length of stay of a temporary work visa, which is three
or six years, depending on the occupation.7

1.5
1.5.1

Model
Preliminaries

The economy is divided in two regions: the United States and the Rest of the World.
Workers from the Rest of the World can migrate to the United States through two
alternative channels: being sponsored by a U.S. employer for an employment-based
visa or applying to the diversity visa lottery. Once they migrate, they cannot go back
to their homeland.
From the model perspective, the two visa processes differ under two aspects: the
7

I observe some new-arrival immigrants whose last year of entry is before 2003. They were
probably still registered as resident abroad when they applied for a permanent visa. This explains
the inconsistency between the higher share of new arrivals with respect to the percentage of arrivals
in the period 2001-2004.
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labor status of the worker in the first period upon migration and the informational
structure of the decision problem. In case of the employment-based visa, the worker
must receive a U.S. job offer so (a) he is surely employed in the first period after
migrating and (b) he observes his prospective U.S. wage before making his decision.
Instead, under a diversity visa, the worker needs to spend some time searching for a
job after arriving in the United States so (a) he may be unemployed in the first period
and (b) he obviously does not know his future U.S. wage when choosing whether to
migrate.8 The assumption is consistent with the statistics in my sample where only
8% of the DV migrants working at the time of the interview were offered their current
job before moving to the United States, against 81% of the EB migrants.9
The timeline is as follows: in each period, after observing their home-country
labor status and income shock, workers receive a U.S. job offer with some probability
p, which they can accept, moving to the United States through an EB visa, or reject,
staying in their home country; then, only if they did not get a U.S. job offer, they
can apply to the diversity lottery and, in case of winning with probability q, enter the
United States with a DV visa. In both scenarios, the individuals who migrate incur
a one-time migration cost, which they observe at the time of their decision.
8

The model by Borjas (1987) assumes perfect knowledge of both domestic and foreign wages, as
in the EB case; while Bertoli (2010) introduces uncertainty in the migration decision through the
same mechanism used in the DV case: workers observe the shock realization of their domestic wage
but not the foreign one. He argues that the different informational structure negatively affects the
theoretical predictions on the migrants’ self-selection in unobservables.
9
Since migrants were only asked about their current job in this question, and it may not be the
first one they got upon migration, I considered only those whose arrival year matches the year they
started their current job.
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1.5.2

Model Specifications

State Space and Initial Conditions
The two regions are indexed by m ∈ {0 : Rest of the World, 1 : United States}.
Workers are heterogeneous in their level of education e ∈ {U, E} and their country of
birth b, each country belonging to a specific set Bi , where i = 1, . . . , 6. In addition,
they are characterized by two possible unobservable types θ ∈ {L, H}, who permanently differ in terms of their skills (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Keane and Wolpin,
1997). The initial type probability, p(θ = H), is equal to 0.5 and it is independent
on the education level or country of origin.10 The state space at time t is:

Ωt = {S, h0,t , h1,t , lt , yt , Mt }

where S = {b, e, θ} denotes the set of time-invariant state variables and Mt ∈ {0, 1} is
the worker’s location at age a, so it is equal to one if the worker has already migrated
to the United States and zero otherwise. Age a and time t are perfectly exchangeable
with a = t + 18 and t = 0, · · · , 46 so age is omitted from the state variables.
The individual’s labor market experience hm,t+1 at time t + 1 is determined by
his work experience hm,t , labor status lt and location Mt in the previous period. I
distinguish between experience acquired in the home country, m = 0, or in the U.S.
m = 1.
hm,t+1 =



hm,t + 1 if lt = 1 and Mt = m

hm,t

otherwise

with hm,0 = 0 and m ∈ {0, 1}.
10

The assumption is very strong but it is necessary since I do not observe wage data for nonmigrants.
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At time t + 1, the worker is unemployed with probability δMt+1 (b).

lt+1 =



0 w.p. δMt+1 (b)

1 w.p. (1 − δM (b))
t+1

Since the level of schooling is taken as exogenous, the labor status of educated workers
is set equal to zero for their college years lt (e = E) = 0 with t = 0, · · · , 3.11 In case
of unemployment, income yt+1 is equal to a constant y; otherwise, it follows the
home-country or U.S. wage function wMt+1 (·), depending on the worker’s location.

yt+1 =



y

w M

if lt+1 = 0
t+1

(S, h0,t+1 , h1,t+1 ) if lt+1 = 1

Wage Functions
At this stage, both home-country and U.S. wages are taken as given: I implicitly
assume the flow of migrants is not large enough to impact prices.
In the home country, the wage function depends on education, work experience
and type. The variable GDP per worker is added to take into account the different
country productivities:

log w0 (b, e, θ, h0 ) = µ00 + µ01 log(GDP per worker) + µ02,Bi 1{e = E}+
+ µ03,Bi h0 + µ04,Bi h20 + µ05,Bi 1{θ = H} + ε0
where b ∈ Bi and ε0 ∼ N (0, σ02 ). The coefficients on education, experience and type
11

Usually, in case of exogenous education, the initial age is set at around 22 years old so to avoid
these adjustments. However, the structure of my problem does not allow me to do the same: first,
6% of the migrants in my dataset moved to the United States before they were 22 so I would need
to exclude them from the sample; second, since most non-college graduates start working before 22,
so I would not be able to use their home-country first wage observations in my estimation.
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differ by country group Bi .
The U.S. wage function shares a similar structure but separates home-country and
U.S. work experience to allow for the possible depreciation of the former. Also, it
does not need to include the variable GDP per worker, being all wages from the same
country production function.

log w1 (b, e, θ, h0 , h1 ) = µ10 + µ12,Bi 1{e = E} + µ13,Bi h1 + µ14,Bi h21 +
+ µ15,Bi h0 + µ16,Bi h20 + µ17,Bi 1{θ = H} + ε1
where b ∈ Bi and ε1 ∼ N (0, σ12 ).
The different coefficients on education, experience and type, at country group
level, allow for different wage dynamics, consistently with the findings in the literature. Several empirical studies state that skill transferability is imperfect and
heterogeneous across migrants (Jasso et al., 2002; Chiswick et al., 2005; Chiswick and
Miller, 2012). Using the NIS dataset, Lessem and Sanders (2013) shows that returns
to US experience are higher for countries with lower GDP.
The home-country and U.S. income shocks are independent from each other.

Migration Opportunity
Since the model does not include the education choice, I prevent college graduates
from migrating before the end of their studies, by setting the probability of receiving
a U.S. job offer or winning the diversity lottery both equal to zero for the first four
periods of their life (e = E and t < 4).
In general, the probability of receiving a job offer from a U.S. employer depends
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on the level of education, the home-country experience and the country of origin:

pt (b, e, h0 | e = U or t ≥ 4)

−1
= 1 + exp α0,Bi + α1 1{e = E} + α2 h0 + α3 h20 + α4 1{b ∈ Beng }
where b ∈ Bi . The constant is equal across countries belonging to the same group Bi ,
but it differentiates according to whether English is the official language (b ∈ Beng ).
The probability of winning the diversity lottery is equal to:

qt (b | e = U or t ≥ 4) =




0

b is not an eligible country



qDi

b ∈ Di is an eligible country

where {Di }i=1,...,6 are the six geographical regions defined by the Immigration and
Nationality Act for the purposes of the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program.

Migration Cost
The migration cost is measured in utility units as follows:

∆t (b, e) = κ0,b + κ1 e + κ2 t + κ3 t2 + ξ

where ξ ∼ N (0, σξ2 ).
The country-specific component κ0,b depends on several variables: distance to the
United States, contiguity, existence of colonial ties, GDP per capita, immigrants from
the same source country already leaving in the U.S. and whether English is the official
language. This set of variables is commonly used in the gravity models analyzing
international trade flows (Ortega and Peri, 2013). The geographical variables are
from the GeoDist Database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
17

Value Functions
Utility is expressed in logarithmic terms. Once the worker has migrated to the United
States, there is no decision left to make because the model does not consider return
migration. Hence, his value function is:

1
Vt1 (Ωt ) = log(yt ) + β EVt+1
(Ωt+1 )

On the other hand, workers still living in their home country are called, in every
period, to choose whether or not to move to the United States, after incurring a
migration cost ∆t (b, e). In case of a U.S. job offer, j = 1, the migration decision
implies accepting the offer; otherwise, j = 0, it translates into applying to the diversity
lottery.

Wt (Ωt | j, w1 ) = max Vt0 (Ωt ) ; Vet1 (Ωt | j, w1 ) − ∆t (b, e)
When making his location choice, the employment-based migrant is aware he will be
employed at the prospective wage w1 in his first period in the United States, so:
Vet1 (Ωt | j = 1, w1 ) = Vt1 (S, h0,t , h1,t , lt = 1, yt = w1 )

Conversely, the diversity migrant may be unemployed with probability δDV and does
not observe his labor status nor his wage if employed. Hence,

Vet1 (Ωt | j = 0) = (1 − δDV ) EVt1 S, h0,t , h1,t , lt = 1, yt = w1 (Ωt )



+ δDV Vt1 S, at , h0,t , h1,t , lt = 0, yt = y



The agent choosing to stay in his home country will face three possible scenarios in
the next period: receiving a U.S. job offer with probability p; not receiving a U.S.
18

job offer but applying and winning a diversity visa with probability (1 − p) · q; not
receiving a US job offer nor winning a diversity visa with probability (1 − p) · (1 − q).
Therefore, his value function is:


Vt0 (Ωt ) = log(yt ) + β pt+1 ( . ) EWt+1 (Ωt+1 | j = 1, w1 ) +

+ 1 − pt+1 ( . ) qt+1 ( . ) EWt+1 (Ωt+1 | j = 0) +



0
+ 1 − pt+1 ( . ) 1 − qt+1 ( . ) EVt+1
(Ωt+1 )

The worker’s problem can be solved recursively, starting from the last period T when
the continuation values are equal to zero (VTm+1 = 0). The distributional assumptions
on the wage and migration cost functions lead to closed-form solutions of the expected
value of the shocks, conditional on the optimal migration choice.

1.6

Estimation Strategy

Estimation is carried by simulated method of moments (SMM). Specifically, the SMM
parameter estimates are chosen to minimize the weighted average distance between
a set of sample moments and their simulated analogs. The weights are given by the
inverse of the estimated variances of the sample statistics.
My wage observations are limited to U.S. immigrants who became legal permanent
residents in 2003. I do not observe workers who never left their origin country (MT =
0), but only those who moved to the United States at some point in their life (MT = 1).
Then, the conditional expected value of their wages is equal to:

E[log wm,t |X, MT = 1] = Xµm + µm
type,b · p(θ = H|MT = 1) + E[εm,t |MT = 1]
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where X collects all the worker’s observable characteristics and m characterizes his
location, i.e. home country, m = 0, or Unites States, m = 1. Since the income shock
is independent over time, his conditional expectation depends only on the contemporaneous migration choice. Self-selection on unobservable skills can be detected in the
conditional probability of being a high-type worker p(θ = H|MT = 1). In absence
of self-selection, it is equal to the unconditional probability p(θ = H). Otherwise, it
may be greater, if self-selection is positive, or smaller, if it is negative. The conditional probability depends on the policy function, in so far as incentives to migrate
are different between low and high types. Since wages enter the policy function, identification requires some exogenous variable affecting the migration choice but not the
salary: in this case, distance to the United States, included in the migration cost,
serves as instrument.
In my simulation, I use Barro and Lee (2013) dataset on educational attainment
as initial distribution. The data include 146 countries from 1950 to 2010. They
are disaggregated by sex, 5-year age intervals and four level of schooling: no formal
education, primary, secondary and tertiary education. College graduates are drawn
from the tertiary education pool while uneducated workers from the residual male
population.
The estimation process requires to draw some individuals from each cohort, simulate the arrival of a job offer from the United States or the winning of the diversity
lottery, and construct the model aggregate statistics by selecting only those who
choose to migrate in 2003. However, this would entail the unnecessary simulation
of workers who would never even have the chance of migrating. Given the very low
probability of winning the diversity lottery or receiving a job offer, it would be computationally challenging to draw a number of individuals sufficient to end up with a
satisfying sample for the simulation moments. Hence, I adopt a different approach,
20

by restricting the initial distribution to “potential immigrants”, i.e. individuals who
get at least one opportunity of migrating through an employment-based or diversity
visa. I also consider the 2003 cohort to be representative of the entire U.S. permanent
immigrant population, since my model does not separate the age and time dimension.
My estimation procedure develops as follows:
1. Draw potential immigrants from the sampling distribution g(S, a, v), where g is
chosen to assure sub-samples by region and education large enough to compute
reliable aggregate statistics.12
2. Simulate potential immigrants’ life, assuming each of them gets one chance
to migrate through a visa v ∈ {EB,DV} at age a.13 In terms of the model,
this translates into the arrival of a job offer, for the EB sub-sample, or the
unanticipated winning of the diversity lottery, in case of application, for the
DV sub-sample.
3. Discard all the individuals who decide to stay in their home country.
4. Construct the sampling weights, as the likelihood ratio between the true probability distribution f (.) and the sampling distribution g(.):

ω(S, a, v) =

f (S, a, v)
g(S, a, v)

where the probability of being a potential EB immigrant from country b, with
12

For instance, I sample potential DV migrants twice as much as potential EB migrants, given
that they have a lower propensity to migrate.
13
In the appendix, I discuss the correction needed to account for multiple migration opportunities.
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education e and age a, is equal to:14

f (S, a, EB) = p(S, a) · fBL (S, a)

while the probability of being a potential DV immigrant is:

f (S, a, DV ) = q(S, a) · (1 − p(S, a)) · fBL (S, a)

The term fBL (S, a) is the worlwide population distribution by country, education and age in 2000 according to the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset.
5. Compute the simulated moments:
P

(ϑ)
i (m̃
Pi

m̃(ϑ) =

i

· ωi )

ωi

6. Choose the parameters ϑ such that:

minϑ [m − m̃(ϑ)]0 W [m − m̃(ϑ)]

where W is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of the estimated variances of the
sample moments m.
I draw four million potential migrants and I end up with around 35,000 effective
migrants at the estimated parameters. I use 339 moments to estimate 65 parameters. The aggregate statistics employed in the estimation process consists of three
14

The probability of receiving a job offer depends also on work experience, so a transformation is
needed:
X
p(b, e, a) =
p(b, e, a, h0 )P r(h0 |b, e, a)
h0

Home-country work experience,
conditional on age, country and education, follows
a binomial dis

tribution B n(e, a), ph (b) with parameters n(e, a) = max a − 18 − 4 · 1{e = E} and ph (b) = δ0 (b).
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groups. Home-country wage moments include the first and last wage before migration
by region and education, work experience categories and set of countries grouped by
geographical location, so to exploit the differences in distance to the United States.
U.S. wage moments consists of the first and current wage (2003 and follow-up 2007)
by region and education, U.S. work experience categories, home-country work experience categories and set of countries grouped by geographical location. Finally, the
migrant distribution moments include the proportion of workers for every of the above
statistics, the ratio of DV winners by region and education, their age at arrival and
the share of EB and DV migrants who unsuccessfully applied for a diversity visa before. The overall probability of migration is used to identify the size of the migration
cost.

1.7

Results

Some of the parameters are set exogenously (Table 1.3). The discount factor β is
equal to 1/1.04 = 0.9615. The home-country unemployment rates, δ0,b , come from
the ILOSTAT database and they refer to male labor force. I set δDV , the probability
of being unemployed in the first year upon migration under the diversity visa, to be
equal to 0.2263, which is the share of unemployed DV migrants among new arrivals
in my sample. The foreign-born unemployment rate in the U.S., δU S , is 0.063 (OECD
data). Given the structure of my dataset, I do not observe many migrants with long
work experience, neither in the U.S. nor in their home country. In the United States,
even with the adjustments of status, I have very few cases that have been working
for more than fifteen years. In the origin country, I face a similar issue since most
migrants left before they were forty. Hence, I impose a threshold to the number of
work experience years h counted in the home-country and U.S. wage function and I
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replace hm , for m = {0, 1}, with h̃m = min(hm , H) and H = 22.
Table 1.3: Parameters set exogenously

β
log(y)
δ0,b
δ1
δDV
q(b)
H = max(h)
σξ

0.9615
0
country unemployment rate
0.063
0.2283
see Table 1.4
22
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Given that this is a partial equilibrium model, I also need to determine exogenously
the probability of winning the diversity visa lottery, otherwise I would not be able
to identify the migration cost. For my purpose, I use the ratio between winners and
on-line applicants by diversity region in the DV-2007 Lottery, which is the earliest
year for which data by the U.S. Department of State are available.
Table 1.4: Probability of winning the diversity lottery

Region

Probability

Africa
Asia
Europe
South America
North America
Oceania
Ineligible countries

0.0113
0.0044
0.0105
0.0063
0.0061
0.0401
0

Countries ineligible in 2003 and 2004: Canada, China (mainland
born), Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India,
Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, the
United Kingdom and dependent territories, and Vietnam. Persons born in Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan, and Northern Ireland were eligible to apply for the DV-2003 and DV-2004
lottery.
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I define six group of countries Bi : OECD high-income countries, Eastern Europe15
and Central Asia, East and South Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North
Africa and Middle East. Since I do not have enough wage observations to separately
identify the last three groups, I assume that Latin America, Africa and Middle East
share the same parameters in the home-country and U.S. wage function.
Tables 1.5–1.8 report the estimated parameters and their asymptotic standard
errors. In the home country wage-function (Table 1.5), the college premium is between
0.40 and 0.60 for all four groups, except for Easter Europe and Central Asia where
it is considerably lower. The same is true also for the type premium. On the other
hand, the coefficient on experience is much higher than in the other areas. The
standard deviation of the income shock is quite large, which is not surprising given
that observations from very different countries are pooled together in the same wage
function, so high variability is to be expected.
In the United States (Table 1.6), the college premium is higher than in the home
country for all four groups, except Latin America, Africa and Middle East. Similarly, high-type migrants from these regions see their wage premium decrease upon
migration, while the opposite is true for high-type workers from OECD high-income
countries, Eastern Europe and Asia. Thus, the results show a different skill transferability across regions, consistently with other studies (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2009).
The coefficient on U.S. experience is very close to the one in their home-country for
migrants belonging to the OECD high-income group while it is much higher for the
others. In case of skilled workers from Latin America, Africa and Middle East, it
means that over time they might offset some of their initial disadvantage, thanks to
a better job match or the acquisition of new skills (Lessem and Sanders, 2013). The
15

The exact title should be non-OECD European countries, however for sake of clarity I use
Eastern Europe since the two mainly correspond to each other.
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Table 1.5: Parameters of the home-country wage function

OECD
highincome

Eastern
Europe &
Central
Asia

East &
South Asia

Latin
America,
Africa &
Middle
East

0.5391
(0.0021)
0.0966
(0.0003)
-0.0025
(0.0000)
1.8582
(0.0046)

0.1461
(0.0007)
0.1920
(0.0005)
-0.0049
(0.0000)
0.2709
(0.0021)

0.4188
(0.0012)
0.0362
(0.0001)
-0.0004
(0.0000)
1.5197
(0.0044)

0.5686
(0.0740)
0.0748
(0.0002)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
1.3408
(0.0049)

constant (µ00 )

6.3324
(0.0116)
log(GDP per worker) (µ01 ) 0.1725
(0.0004)
education (µ02,Bi )

experience (µ03,Bi )
experience sqrd (µ04,Bi )
type (µ05,Bi )
sd. income shock (σ0 )

2.1190
(0.0072)
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses

high return to U.S. experience could also be related to further education pursued by
the migrants once in the United States, for example a Master: since my model only
discriminates between college and non-college graduates. I exclude from the sample
those who got their bachelor degree after migrating, but I do not account for other
specialization degrees. Interestingly, the coefficient on home-country experience is
relevant only for the OECD high-income group. The standard deviation of the income shock is much lower than in the home-country wage function since in this case
there is no cross-country variability.
Table 1.7 shows the parameters governing the probability of receiving a job offer
from a U.S. employer. The constant on Eastern Europe and Central Asia is very low,
compared to the other countries. Education has a positive coefficient, as expected
given that most of the EB visa categories require a bachelor degree to apply.
The estimated migration cost is remarkably high: the average for those who mi26

Table 1.6: Parameters of the U.S. wage function

constant (µ10 )
education (µ11,Bi )
US exp. (µ12,Bi )
US exp. sqrd (µ13,Bi )
HC exp. (µ14,Bi )
HC exp. sqrd (µ14,Bi )
type (µ16,Bi )

OECD
highincome

Eastern
Europe &
Central
Asia

East &
South Asia

Latin
America,
Africa &
Middle
East

0.6838
(0.0023)
0.0983
(0.0003)
-0.0016
(0.0000)
0.0358
(0.0002)
-0.0006
(0.0000)
2.2791
(0.0045)

0.4270
(0.0025)
0.3844
(0.0006)
-0.0190
(0.0000)
0.0146
(0.0001)
-0.0006
(0.0000)
1.0858
(0.0018)

0.7552
(0.0018)
0.2054
(0.0003)
-0.0072
(0.0000)
0.0095
(0.0000)
-0.0006
(0.0000)
2.0603
(0.0071)

0.4871
(0.0634)
0.2931
(0.0004)
-0.0128
(0.0000)
0.0123
(0.0129)
0.0000
(0.0007)
0.7999
(0.0037)

7.9973
(0.0093)

sd. income shock (σ1 )

1.2263
(0.0048)
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
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Table 1.7: Parameters of the probability of a U.S. job offer

constant (α0,Bi )
OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East
education (α1 )
experience (α2 )
experience sq. (α3 )
English off. Lang. (α4 )
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
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-8.2638
(0.0762)
-30.4239
(175.06)
-8.1509
(0.0720)
-6.5409
(0.0894)
-10.3173
(1.0888)
-8.8568
(0.1766)
1.6349
(0.0638)
0.0301
(0.0117)
-0.0027
(0.0006)
-0.0001
(0.0700)

grated is equal to 14.76 in utility terms. It is equivalent to receiving in each period a
U.S. salary twice the one in the home country, assuming a remaining work life of forty
years. It is consistent with the estimates by Alker and Kennan (2011) who find the
U.S. inter-state moving cost to be on the order of $300.000 for high-school graduates.
The migration cost is indeed increasing with distance to the U.S. so workers from
farer countries will move only if their gains from migration are higher. The cost function decreases with contiguity, colonial ties16 and English being the official language.
The coefficient on the percentage of compatriots already living in the U.S. is negative, consistently with the presence of positive network effects (Bertoli and Rapoport,
2015). College graduates have lower migration costs, in line with the evidence that
educated workers migrate more even when they have less incentive in terms of wage
differentials. The negative coefficient on GDP per capita suggests the presence of
budget constraints for migrants from poorer countries.
Figures 1.1–1.3 and Tables 1.9–1.10 show the model fit. The model catches quite
well the migrants’ age profile by origin. It slightly overestimates the share of workers
by Latin America, Africa and Middle East leaving their home country after 45 years
old (Figure 1.1). Figure 1.2 reports the distribution of the first wage in the migrants’
home country, first column, and the last one before migrating, second column. The
simulation returns wage distributions more disperse than in the data, especially in
the OECD high-income countries and in East & South Asia. This is due to the
large value of the estimated income shock standard deviation, as a result of the wage
function trying to fit observations from very different countries. Figure 1.2 reports
the distribution of the migrants’ first wage in the United States, first column, and the
one they declared in the 2003 interview, second column. The bimodal distribution of
16

The United Kingdom and the Philippines are the only two countries with colonial ties to the
United States.
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Table 1.8: Parameters of the migration cost function

constant (κ0 )

50.4573
(0.1104)
1.0676
(0.0024)
-13.0574
(0.0584)
-5.4405
(0.0511)
-5.2015
(0.0173)
-1.9620
(0.0054)
-2.9713
(0.0074)
-10.1175
(0.0246)
-0.0884
(0.0004)
0.0011
(0.0000)

log(Distance)
contiguity
colonial ties
English off. Lang.
% pop. in US in 2000
log(GDP per capita)
education (α1 )
age over 18 (α2 )
age over 18 sq. (α3 )
Standard errors in parentheses
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the 2003 simulated wage comes from the process I use to construct the statistic17 .
Figure 1.1: Model fit - Migrants’ age distribution by origin

17
In the data, each individual was interviewed at a different point of their U.S. tenure, depending
on the year they migrated. The time dimension does not appear in my model, so I need to mimic
the interview occurence to compare the simulated wage to the one in the first-round of the survey.
n. years since arrival
I define the variable % = total
years will live in US and I use the empirical distribution f (%) by country
of origin and education to assign different probabilities to different observation times. The distance
between the data and the simulated statistic is therefore the combination of two components: the
difference in wages by U.S. experience and the difference in U.S. experience at the time of the
interview.
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Figure 1.2: Model fit - Migrants’ wage distribution in their home country
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Figure 1.3: Model fit - Migrants’ wage distribution in the U.S.
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Table 1.9 reports the distribution of migrants by origin and education. The total
allocation per group of countries is quite close to the data. The model overestimates
the share of college graduates for all groups except Latin America, Africa and Middle
East where it is lower. On average, the share of employment-based migrants resulting
from the simulation falls short of 15% when compared to the data (Table 1.10).
Table 1.9: Model fit - Migrants’ distribution by origin and education

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America, Africa & Middle East

Uneducated
Actual
Predicted

Educated
Actual
Predicted

0.0277
0.0684
0.0511
0.2077

0.1230
0.0815
0.2890
0.1517

0.0123
0.0359
0.0181
0.1697

0.1422
0.1390
0.3604
0.1223

Table 1.10: Model fit - Share of EB migrants by origin

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East

Actual

Predicted

0.8420
0.1646
0.8026
0.7798
0.0866
0.2253

0.6986
0.0000
0.6656
0.4954
0.0119
0.1968

Overall, the percentage of high-type migrants is equal to 66.37%. Since it is higher
than the initial probability, 50%, it implies positive self-selection among migrants.
This is particularly true for those coming from the OECD high-income countries,
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East and South Asia. This is not surprising since
in these areas the wage differential is larger for the high-type workers so they have
more incentive to move to the United States. Interestingly, the positive self-selection
is stronger for uneducated workers. Since they are less likely to migrate because they
do not benefit from the higher college premium and they bear a greater migration cost,
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the high-type incentive plays an even bigger role for them. This is case of selection
on observable and unobservable skills going in opposite directions, one of the possible
scenarios predicted by the model in Bertoli (2010). On the other hand, migrants from
Latin America, Africa and Middle East, who see their high-type premium decrease
once in the United States, are negatively selected. In Latin America, the result is
more evident for educated workers, who already have a lower incentive to migrate
due to the reduced college premium. The situation is reversed in Sub-Saharan Africa,
despite the wage function parameters being the same as in Latin America. At a
closer look, most of the migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa come from countries with
very high unemployment rates, on the order of 22%. The unemployment spell is
more painful to educated workers because their wage, in times of employment, is
larger. In order to escape the huge unemployment rates, college graduates from SubSaharan Africa are more willing to move to the Unites States than their Latin America
counterparts. Their incentive is so large to reverse the prediction on unobservables’
self-selection, based uniquely on wage differentials, between educated and uneducated
workers, which is fulfilled in case of Latin America. The result shares the same logic as
Rendon and Cuecuecha (2010), who argue that labor market mobility is as important
as wage differentials.
Table 1.11: Share of high-type migrants by origin and education

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East
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Uneducated

Educated

0.7846
1.0000
0.9884
0.3079
0.0195
-

0.7848
0.9149
0.8576
0.1939
0.2772
0.0116

Table 1.12: Share of high-type migrants by origin and visa category

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East

1.8
1.8.1

DV

EB

0.9795
0.9324
0.8045
0.3135
0.1290
0.0000

0.7007
0.9489
0.8937
0.2115
0.2746
0.0591

Policy Experiment
Experiment Design

Since the Immigration Act of 1990, U.S. policy-makers made several attempts to
radically change the structure of the American visa system. So far, none of them
has succeeded to pass the vote of both houses of the Congress. The latest one is the
S. 1720 bill, also known as the RAISE (Reforming American Immigration for Strong
Employment) Act, introduced in the Senate in August 2017. On top of changes to the
family preference path, the bill would end the Diversity Visa Program and introduce
a visa-point system18 . Table 1.13 displays the details of the proposed point allocation
scheme. The new system would favor immigrants between 26 and 30 years old, English
proficient, with an advanced degree in scientific and technological fields, especially
if earned in the United States. Employer sponsorship would not be necessary any
more, but a job offer with a high enough salary would give the applicant additional
points. Investors and individuals who achieved extraordinary results in their life,
as Nobel laureates or Olympic medal winners, would be awarded extra points as
well. Only immigrants accruing more than 30 points would be eligible to submit an
18

A previous bill, S. 744, also proposed a visa-point system. The bill passed the vote in the Senate
in June 2013, but was never discussed in the House of the Representatives.
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application. The worldwide annual limitation would remain 140,000 visas as it is now
for the employment preference category. No limit would be imposed at the country
level. Point-based visas would be issued to the highest ranked applicants up to the
achievement of the annual limit.
The bill has been at the center of debate with opposite factions arguing about
the possible effect on the U.S. economy. A step back is necessary to ask: how would
the migrants’ distribution, in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics,
change if the new visa-point system was in place? I embed a simplified version of
the proposed point allocation scheme in my estimated model to answer the question.
Each potential immigrant gets a number of points equal to:

v(S, a, j) =

8
X

νj,i 1{a ∈ Ai } + νe 1{e = E} +

i=1

5
X

νep,i 1{toeflb,e ∈ EPi }+

i=i

+ νθ 1{b ∈ {OECD high-income, East & South Asia}, θ = H, j = 1}
where S = {b, e, θ}, νa,i are the points assigned by age category Ai , νe = 4, i.e. the
difference in points between high-school and non-U.S. college graduates, νep,i are the
points assigned by English proficiency category EPi and νθ = 8, i.e. the number
of points allocated to applicants with a highly compensated job offer19 . English
proficiency is by country of origin and level of schooling: the distribution comes from
the score data for the TOEFL exam20 . Not all the immigrants getting a U.S. job
offer, j = 1, are awarded additional points: first, they must be high-type workers,
θ = H, and second, they must come from the OECD high-income or the East & South
Asia countries. The two conditions were chosen to reflect the intent behind the high
19
Annual salary offered is at least 200% but less than 300% of the median household income in
the state of employment.
20
Test and Score Data Summary for TOEFL iBT Tests (January 2017 – December 2017 Test
Data). TOEFL, which stands for Test of English as a Foreign Language, is a standardized test to
measure the English language ability of non-native speakers.
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Table 1.13: Visa point system under the RAISE Act
Points
Age (10 points maximum) Between 18 and 21
Between 22 and 25
Between 26 and 30
Between 31 and 35
Between 36 and 40
Between 41 and 45
Between 46 and 50
51 or older

6 points
8 points
10 points
8 points
6 points
4 points
2 points
0 points

Formal education (13 points maximum)
U.S. or Foreign High School Degree
Foreign bachelor’s degree
U.S. Bachelors Degree
Foreign master’s degree in Science, Technology, Engineering or Mathematics
(STEM)
U.S. STEM Masters Degree
Foreign Professional Degree or Doctoral STEM
U.S. Professional Degree or Doctoral STEM

8 points
10 points
13 points

English language proficiency (12 points maximum)
1st – 5th deciles
6th – 7th deciles
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

0 points
6 points
10 points
11 points
12 points

1 point
5 points
6 points
7 points

Extraordinary achievement (40 points maximum)
Nobel Laureate or comparable recognition
25 points
Individual Olympic medal or first place in a comparable international sporting 15 points
event
Job offer/highly compensated employment (13 points maximum)
Annual salary offered is at least 150% but less than 200% of the median household 5 points
income in the state of employment
Annual salary offered is at least 200% but less than 300% of the median household 8 points
income in the state of employment
Annual salary offered is at least 300% of the median household income in the 13 points
state of employment
Investment (12 points maximum)
Investment of at least $1.35 million but less than $1.8 million in a U.S. New 6 points
Commercial Enterprise (NCE); maintain the investment for three years and play
active role in managing the NCE as primary occupation
Investment of at least $1.8 million in a U.S. NCE
12 points
Valid (pre-existing) offer of admission under family preference category
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2 points

compensation criterion. The high types earn, on average, a greater wage than the
low types and the difference is particularly striking in case of workers coming from
the OECD high-income or the East & South Asia countries, where the type premium
in the U.S. wage function is above two.
An applicant gets a visa if

v(S, a, j) +  ≥ v

where

 ∼ N (0, 1)

Some of the attributes considered by the RAISE point allocation scheme are not
included in my model (for example, degrees higher than bachelor or received in the
United States) so it would not be fair to use the threshold of v = 30, established by
the bill. Moreover, I am interested only in the composition effect of the point-based
system so I would like to keep the size of the migrant population unchanged. Hence,
the threshold is set at v = 27.318, such that the number of foreign workers migrating
to the United States is the same as in the baseline model.
Then, the probability of migrating upon visa application is, in absence of a U.S.
job offer:

q̃(S, j) = 1 − Φ v − v(S, j, m = 0)
while, in presence of a U.S. job offer:


p̃(S, j, h0 ) = p(b, e, h0 ) · 1 − Φ v − v(S, j, m = 1)

The assumptions about the different informational structure and labor status of migrants with or without job offer stay valid.
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1.8.2

Experiment Results

Figure 1.4 and Tables 1.14–1.16 show the results from the policy experiment. The
quasi totality of migrants are college graduates. 95% of them come from the OECD
high-income (64%) or the East & South Asia (31%) countries. The geographical
distribution is not driven by the points allocated to highly compensated job positions,
as the proportion of workers moving to the United States with a job offer already in
place decreases dramatically. That is because in the baseline model, some major
countries, as India or Canada, were completely excluded from the Diversity Visa
Program so employer sponsorship was their only way into the United States. Age at
migration is highly concentrated around 26-30 years old. So, the proposed visa-point
system works in terms of observable characteristics, channeling the migrants’ pool
towards the desired attributes, maybe even too so given the lack of differentiation in
terms of schooling, age and origin.
Table 1.14: Policy experiment - Migrants’ distribution by origin and education

Uneducated
Baseline Experiment
OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America, Africa & Middle East

0.0111
0.0377
0.0174
0.1799

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Educated
Baseline Experiment
0.1458
0.1362
0.3522
0.1195

0.6419
0.0101
0.3072
0.0408

The next step is looking at the unobservable characteristics, i.e. the type distribution. The point allocation scheme tries to capture some of the unobservables by
rewarding highly compensated job offers. However, the direct effect is small given
the low proportion of migrants leaving their home country with secure employment
prospects. Overall, there is no improvement in the proportion of high-type workers,
actually the percentage slightly decreases from 66.37% to 63.54%. The reduction is
40

Figure 1.4: Policy experiment - Migrants’ age distribution by origin
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Table 1.15: Policy experiment - Share of migrants with a job offer by origin

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East

Baseline

Experiment

0.6812
0.0000
0.6740
0.4752
0.0114
0.2215

0.0391
0.0000
0.1468
0.0078
0.0002
0.0015

due to migrants from the OECD high-income countries, in particular to Canadian
workers, whose weight is more than doubled in the group, now that they can get a
visa without a job offer. Their share of low types is higher compared to other OECD
countries, because they have a smaller migration cost, due to contiguity to the United
States. The proportion of high types has increased among East & South Asia workers: since they are the one migrating the most with a job offer, it may be the direct
consequence of the additional points allocated to highly compensated employment.
As for the remaining areas, the change in the type distribution is consistent with
workers having more incentive to migrate, all things being equal. Actually, their
probability of getting a visa has decreased and so is the continuation value in their
home country. Hence, individuals with lower incentive to migrate, namely low types
in Eastern Europe & Central Asia and high-type in Latin America, Africa & Middle
East, now move more often to the United States. The effect is captured thanks to
the dynamic structure of the model.

1.9

Conclusions

This paper develops and estimates a life cycle model of migration choice from the
rest of the world to the United States through two possible paths: the employment
preference visa or the diversity program. The wage function includes both observable
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Table 1.16: Policy experiment - Share of high-type migrants by origin and education

OECD high-income
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
East & South Asia
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East

Baseline

Experiment

0.7888
0.9213
0.8747
0.2675
0.1260
0.0098

0.5139
0.8448
0.9190
0.4452
0.4321
0.2004

skills, in terms of college degree, and unobservable skills, in terms of high versus
low types. The estimated parameters predict positive self-selection on both type of
skills for migrants coming from Europe, Asia and other OECD high-income countries:
the degree of selection on unobservables is actually higher for uneducated rather than
educated workers, because their incentive to move to the United States is lower. Then,
I conduct a policy experiment by applying a simplified version of the visa-point system
proposed by the RAISE Act to the model. I find that the new system would bring to
the U.S. only young and educated workers, mostly coming from OECD high-income
countries or East and South Asia. However, without per-country limitations, the
policy attracts an excessive number of migrants from the closest countries, and since
their migration cost is lower they are less favorably selected in terms of unobservable
skills. In this case, less diversity translates into less uniqueness. To fix the distortion,
the point allocation scheme should increase the weight to highly compensated job
offers, which allow to identify high types.
There are several prospects for future research. First, the model takes education as
exogenous, while it may play an important role in the migration decision, given that
the U.S. are the country with the largest number of international students. Therefore,
it is necessary to endogenize the schooling choice in two directions: whether to pursue
a college degree and where to pursue it, in its own country of origin or in the United
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States. Second, visa policies are now built in a partial equilibrium framework where
the probability of being admitted does not depend on others’ behavior. Bringing the
model to the general equilibrium framework would allow to take into account the visa
numerical limitations and better evaluate the consequences of a policy change.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of H-1B Visa on U.S.
Innovation
2.1

Introduction

The United States are the country of immigrants by definition. Many have pointed
out to the key contribution of foreign talents to the U.S. innovation leadership in
the world. It is hardly surprising if we look at some raw data: in the 2000 Census,
immigrants represent 24% of the STEM (Science, TEchnology and Math) workforce
with a bachelor and 47% of the STEM workforce with a doctorate (Kerr and Lincoln,
2010). The numbers are impressive after considering that their share over the the total
labor force reaches just 12%. Wadhwa et al. (2007) finds that 24.2% of international
patent applications21 filed from the U.S. in 2006 have at least one foreign inventor.
Another work by Wadhwa et al. (2012) reports that 24.3% of the engineering and
technology companies founded between 2006 and 2012 list at least one key founder
as foreign-born and the percentage rises to 43.9% if we restrict our attention to the
Sylicon Valley.
Given the above figures and their policy implications, the issue has drawn the
attention of many economic researchers seeking to shed light on the link between
innovation and immigration. My paper finds its collocation in this current of the
literature. I use data about patents and H-1B applications to test different hypothesis.
21

International patent applications are filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty which allows
the inventor to seek patent protection for an invention simultaneously in each of the 147 countries
supporting the Treaty.
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H-1B visa were introduced by the Immigration Act of 1990 as non-immigrant visas
for temporary workers in specialty occupations. The term “specialty occupation” does
not lead to a formal requirement but the usual interpretation implies the worker has
at least a bachelor. The H-1B visa lasts 3 years after which it can be renewed for the
same period of time. The U.S. government regulates the entry of temporary workers
through quotas.
Workers entering the United States under H-1B visa represent the perfect measure
for skilled immigration. Unfortunately, there are no micro data on H-1B issuances but
there are firm-level records on the Labor Condition Application (LCA) the employer
needs to submit before petitioning for the visa. The database has been used by Ruiz
et al. (2012) to study the demand for H-1B workers in U.S. metropolitan areas and
marginally by Kerr and Lincoln (2010) to infer the link between H-1B visa and U.S.
inventions by ethnicity. However, this is the first time, at least at my knowledge,
which the database is used in such an extensive way. The final product is a unified
firm-level dataset of patents and LCA from 2001 to 2007, offering many insights on
the mechanism through which skilled immigration affects innovation.
The first step of my analysis aims at finding the overall effect of H-1B visa on
the firm patent activity. Chellaraj et al. (2008) conduct a time series analysis on
patent grants revealing a positive impact of foreign graduate students over time.
Maskus et al. (2010) look more closely to the science and engineering departments
from 1973 to 1988 but they don’t find any significant difference between native and
foreign doctoral students in terms of contribution to publications and citations. They
argue that this is a sign of the optimal behavior of universities in choosing PhD
students. The state level analysis by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) reveals that
a 1% increase in the share of high-skilled immigrants leads to 15% more patents.
Hunt (2011) focus on the distinction between different categories of visa finding that
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immigrants who entered through a work or student visa outperforms natives in terms
of wage, patents and start-up founded. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) find that higher H1B admissions increase the number of patents by inventors with Chinese and Indian
names in cities and firms which are more dependent on H-1B relatively to others.
However, they have limited effect on native patenting.
My results suggest that LCA have a small but positive effect on innovation: a
10% increase in applications leads to 0.6% more patents at firm level. The estimates
improve when I use an instrumental variable to address the endogeneity of LCA,
signaling the presence of measurement error in the first place. The instrument is
constructed by the interaction of two variables: H1-B quotas over time and the number of Asian inventors who patented within the firm in the 90s. It is similar to the
one already used in the immigration literature (DiNardo and Card (2000), Hunt and
Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), Kerr and Lincoln (2010)).
Another channel through which skilled immigration affects innovation is the market size effect (Acemoglu, 2002): the profitability of patents increases pushing firms
to invest more in R&D and to hire more inventors. In my data, the hypothesis is
confirmed by the positive impact of LCA on the number of future new inventors.
Immigrants can benefit the firm but harm the native workers in terms of wages
(Borjas, 2005) or displacement (Borjas, 2004). Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2013) observe
that workers in STEM occupations leaving the firm in high immigration periods have
harder time to find a new job and suffer larger wage declines compared to non-STEM
workers. The key point is the degree of substitutability between foreign and native
workers, as noticed by Ottaviano et al. (2005). By allowing imperfect substitutability,
as supported by their estimates, they find that a 10% increase in total employment
due to immigration can lead to an overall increase in wages of 3-4%. I don’t observe
wages for native workers so I can’t test any hypothesis in that direction. However,
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I can exclude any crowd-out effect by means of H-1B workers: the probability for
incumbent inventors to patent again in the future in the same firm increases as the
number of LCA grows.
The positive impact on the incumbent patent activity is not just at the extensive
margin but also at the intensive one. There may be several reasons behind this higher
production of ideas. Incumbents may feel threatened by the newcomers and pushed
to patent more to escape the competition. As an alternative, the arrival of inventors bringing different culture and expertise may generate profitable collaborations
and positive spillovers, as suggested by Alesina et al. (2013) and Niebuhr (2006). I
distinguish the patents by the ranking of inventors. I argue that patents where the
incumbent is the first inventor are likely to be related to the escape competition effect
while patents where he appears as one of the subsequent inventors and the newcomer
is the first one are likely to be the result of collaboration. Both effects are present in
my data but I cannot say which one is prevailing.
Finally, I exploit citations to detect additional spillovers. I construct three indices
capturing the diversity of citations by respectively country, state and class. Inventors
in firms applying for more H-1B workers cite patents more sparse in terms of country
and class. I interpret the results as supporting the presence of positive spillovers.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes LCA and patents data;
Sections 3 presents the empirical strategy applied; Section 4 contains the results of
the estimation; Section 5 draws some concluding remarks.

2.2

Data

The LCA database is publicly released by the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL). Every
employer petitioning for H-1B visa needs to first file an LCA. The purpose of the
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LCA is to ensure that, by hiring foreign workers, the firm does not harm the existing
employees. In order to prove that, the employer must declare the work location, the
occupation and the proposed wage for the H-1B worker. The compensation must be
equal or higher than the prevailing wage for the same occupation and work area. The
value of the prevailing wage comes from collective bargaining or it can be required to
the State Employment Security Agency. In addition, by signing the LCA, the firm
attests that on the application date no strike, lock-out or work stoppage is in course
in the same work location and occupation of the H-1B worker.22 The employer is not
required to advertise the position filled by the foreign worker but a copy of the LCA
must be published at the workplace or notified to the employee representative.
The LCA is just the first step of the process leading to the issuance of the H-1B
visa. Once, it is certified by the DoL, the employer can file a H-1B petition to the USCIS which makes the final decision. So, even after excluding all the applications which
have been withdrawn or rejected by the DoL, the data are inflated with respect to the
real number of H-1B issued. In other words, there is no one-to-one correspondence
between LCA records and H-1B visa. In addition, the database misses to distinguish
between applications for new issuances and renewals. The employer is required to fill
an LCA application in both cases but I don’t observe the distinction. Ideally, for my
analysis, I would restrict the sample only to new issuances.
Despite some measurement error, the LCA database represents a very valuable
resource for inferring the number of non-immigrant workers employed in a firm. The
data go from 2001 to 2012. The records are divided by fiscal years. However, since
the starting date for the certification is reported, I take that as time reference.
Given that my study focus on the impact of the H-1B visa on innovation, I am
particularly interested in the STEM occupations. The database uses 3-digit DOT
22

U.S. Department of Labor
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occupation codes from 2001 to 2008, 6-digit 2000 SOC codes from 2009 to 2010 and
6-digit 2010 SOC codes from 2011 on. I identify the STEM occupations through the
list provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.23 The document specifies the STEM
occupations in terms of 2010 SOC code so I further use the crosswalks between 2010
SOC and 2000 SOC codes24 and between 2000 SOC and DOT codes25 to complete
the identification. Moreover, I run a word search in the occupation title to refine my
classification, for example by including all the observations with the word “engineer”
or excluding all the ones with the word “accountant”. The passage from DOT to
SOC codes may lead to some discrepancies over time on the entire sample. However,
after merging the LCA database to the patent data, I restrict my sample to the time
interval going from 2001 to 2007 where only DOT codes are used so the classification
between STEM and non-STEM occupations is consistent over time.
For patents, I use jointly two different datasets, the dataset by NBER and the
dataset by Lai et al. (2001). The NBER dataset includes all the USPTO patents
granted between 1976 and 2006 and divided by assignee. The advantage of the dataset
is the identification of each assignee by a unique code through a name matching
algorithm. The code is more accurate than the one assigned by USPTO since it
takes care of all the cases where the assignee is the same but the name was recorded
differently originating different codes. On the other side, the dataset by Lai et al.
(2001) covers all the patents granted between 1975 and 2010 divided by inventors.
Similarly to the NBER dataset, they use a disambiguation algorithm to identify
inventors and assign a unique number to each of them. I merge the two datasets to
get full identification of both assignees and inventors.
23

“Detailed 2010 SOC occupations included in STEM”. SOC Policy Committee recommendation
to the Office of Management and Business (U.S. government)
24
Bureau of Labor Statistics
25
“ETA Form 9035CP General Instructions for the 9035 and 9035E - Appendix I”. Department
of Labor
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I use the application year as time reference since it is the one closer to the moment
when the idea has originated. However, since patents are recorded only after they
have been granted and the average time between the application and the grant date
is about three years, I need to exclude all the patents granted after 2007 to avoid the
truncation bias.
In order to merge the LCA and the patent dataset, I first need to standardize the
employer names in the LCA records. I use a modified version of the standardization
routine applied by Jim Bessen in the NBER Patent Project. By merging the two
datasets through a name matching algorithm, I further restrict my sample to 7% of
the total number of employers and 29.17% of the total number of LCA applications.
The share of identified firms seems small but if we concentrate our attention to the
first 100 employers by LCA applications, the percentage grows to 65% both in terms
of number of firms and applications. Moreover, most of the excluded employers are
consultancy firms which largely use H-1B workers but don’t produce any patents so
they are irrelevant for my analysis. In sum, I end up with a sample of around 7,000
firms, which I consider being fairly representative of the population of firms hiring
H-1B workers and producing patents.

2.3
2.3.1

Empirical Framework
Analysis by Assignee

I start my analysis at the firm level by assessing the relationship between H-1B workers
and patents, according to the following regression:

log(Pi,t ) = α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + δt + ηi + i,t
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where Pi,t is the number of utility patents for which firm i applied in year t, LCAi,t is
the number of non-immigrant workers in STEM occupations for which firm i filed an
LCA in year t and P Si,t is the patent stock of firm i at time t. The panel dimension
of my dataset allows me to add firm and year fixed effect to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. I use the stock of patents of the assignee as proxy for its size since I
don’t have any information about the total number of employees and I suspect the
size of the firm over time may be correlated to both patents and H-1B applications.
In this way, I can solve the omitted variable issue.
In the log-log specification above, all the observations where the number of patents
is equal to zero are discarded. So I am using only part of the information I have. The
solution suggested by Hausman et al. (1984) is to apply a Poisson regression model
instead where


log E[Pi,t |Xi,t ] = α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + δt + ηi

and Pi,t is distributed according to a Poisson with parameter λi,t so that E[Pi,t |Xi,t ] =
λi,t . The specification is really similar to the log-log case and the interpretation of the
result is the same, which makes the comparison easy. In addition, the observations
where Pi,t is equal to zero are not discharged but they are fully used in the estimation
of the model.
If we assume that Pi,t has a Poisson distribution, we imply the mean and variance
are equal. This is not the case for the patents in the sample where we observe high
dispersion. The issue doesn’t affect the consistency of the estimated coefficient but
its standard error. Hausman et al. (1984) propose a Negative Binomial regression
model where the mean of the distribution is unchanged but the variance takes into
account the overdispersion. For sake of robustness, I will present the estimates for all
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three models.
All the above regressions could return biased estimates if the error term is correlated to any of the regressor, giving rise to an endogeneity problem. In my case,
there may be some concerns: it is easy to imagine a situation where the firm is hit by
a positive innovation shock and needs more employees to develop its ideas. So, the
increase in H-1B workers would be correlated to the increase in patents, generating a
positive coefficient β1 even without any causal relationship.
In order to solve the endogeneity problem, I need to instrument the H-1B regressor
with a variable which is correlated to LCAs but exogenous to the quantity of patents
produced. The annual quotas set by the government for the issuance of H-1B visa
represent the perfect instrument. They are independent from the error term because
they are decided at authority level so they do not depend on the firm decisions.26
They are also correlated to LCAs because the H-1B petition process is costly27 so, if
the quota is low, we may expect firms to be more cautious in applying for H-1B visas
they can hardly get. The H-1B quota does not depend on the country of origin of the
worker, differently from the quotas for permanent residency. It was equal to 195,000
visa from 2001 to 2003. It decreased to 65,000 visa in 2004 and then increased again
to 85,000 visa in 2006 when the government allowed for an additional 20,000 quota
reserved to foreign students graduating from U.S. colleges.
The H-1B quota changes over time but it is constant across firms so we need to
find a variable to interact, which could reflect the higher dependency of the firm on H1B workers. The immigration literature has often used the stock of immigrants from
a particular country to instrument the subsequent flow. The first paper to apply this
26

The lobbying activity by firms which are highly dependent from H-1B visa could invalidate this
statement but I am assuming the result of this activity is not immediate so that there is some time
displacement between the innovative shock and the increase in H-1B. Time dummies and firm fixed
effect should do the rest.
27
Fees go from a minimum of $1,575 to a maximum of $5,550 per worker.
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technique was DiNardo and Card (2000). They study the crowd-out effect of lowskill immigrants on native workers, facing a similar endogeneity problem. However,
they argue that immigrants tend to settle in place where communities from the same
country are already established. Since most of the low-skill immigration flow in the 80s
came from Mexico, they use the relative Mexican population in 1970 as instrument. It
doesn’t suffer from endogeneity issues and it is correlated with the regressor of interest.
I apply a similar approach by using the quantity of Asian inventors who patented in
the firm between 1990 and 2000 but not after as my instrumental variable. In 2004,
around 65% of the new H-1B visa issuances were from East Asia.28 It’s reasonable to
expect non-immigrants workers to prefer firms with a larger number of employees from
their same country of origin, for cultural and network reasons. In the meanwhile, by
excluding all the Asian inventors who patented also after 2000 I am sure the variable
is not correlated to the error term.
Unfortunately, the patent records do not tell the country of birth of the inventor
so I identify Asian inventors by matching their surnames to a list of Asian surnames,
constructed from the results of Lauderdale and Kestenbaum (2000) and Kerr (2007).
I am aware that ethnicity and country of birth may not correspond but I am confident
the variable represents a good guess of the firm dependency from H-1B workers. Hence
the instrumental variable is:

Instrumenti,t = log(Asiani ) × log(H-1B quotat )

I am also interested to test the market size effect of H-1B workers. The increase
in high-skilled immigration may increase the profitability of patents and push firms
to hire even more inventors. I don’t observe the time of entry of a new inventor in
28

“Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B): Fiscal Year 2004”. USCIS
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the firm but I can observe if he has ever patented with that assignee before. The
regression of interest is:

log(New Invi,t+1 ) = α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + δt + ηi + i,t

where New Invi,t+1 is the number of inventors who have never patented in the firm
before. Again, in addition to the log-log regression, I use a Poisson and a Negative
Binomial regression as robustness check. I suspect there is the same endogeneity issue
as before so I also run a 2SLS regression using the instrument I described above.

2.3.2

Analysis by Incumbent Inventor

After examining the overall impact of LCAs on the firm patenting activity, I want to
study the effect on incumbent inventors, i.e. inventors already working in the firm
when the immigration flow takes place. The issue arises several questions: are foreign
and native inventors substitutes or complements in the patent production function?
Does the arrival of H-1B workers trigger an escape competition mechanism so that
incumbents are pushed into producing more ideas? Are incumbents collaborating
with the new inventors on the same innovation?
The analysis starts with a probit model where I explore the effect of LCAs on
incumbent patenting activity at the extensive margin:




E[Yji,t |X] = Φ α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + β3 Agej,t + δt + ηi + ji,t

where Yji,t is equal to 1 if I observe the inventor j patenting in the firm i in the years
after t. I identify incumbent inventors as the ones who have already patented with the
assignee before t. Inventors who patented for the first time in year t are discarded.
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Agej,t is the time between t and the first patent of the inventor j. If the firm is
substituting old inventors with H-1B workers, this could bias the coefficient estimates
in one direction or the other so I add Agej,t as control variable. The model is not
linear so in order to capture the firm fixed effect, I use the Chamberlaine-Mundlak
correction by including as regressors the time average of log(LCAi,t ) and log(PSi,t ).
I continue by testing the impact of H-1B workers on incumbent patenting activity
at the intensive margin:

log(Pji,t ) = α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + β3 Agej,t + δt + ηji + ji,t

As before, since I am interested only in incumbent inventors, I discard all the inventors
who patented for the first time in year t.
Discerning the difference between escape competition and collaboration effect is
not easy. I try to exploit the different ranking of inventors within the same patent.
The ranking is not arbitrary: the first inventor is really the one bringing the main
contribute to the invention. The incumbent, willing to prove his value against newcomers, is more likely to concentrate his activity on patents where he is the first
inventor and so he can gain higher recognition. Therefore, I interpret the effect of
LCAs on this subset of patents as escape competition effect.
Conversely, collaboration with H-1B workers may realize through patents where
the newcomer is the first inventor and the incumbent is one of the subsequent. In this
case, the entrant is bringing the key piece of knowledge for the patent. Hence, I see
the effect of H-1B workers on this subset of patents as collaboration effect. I identify
an inventor who patent for the first time in year t as newcomer. Since I don’t observe
the country of birth of inventors, I cannot distinguish between natives and foreigners
so I am implicitly assuming all the newcomers are H-1B workers.

56

As before, all the models explained in this section are also estimated by instrumenting the number of LCAs with the interaction between H-1B quotas and Asian
incumbent inventors within the firm.

2.3.3

Citation Analysis

Even if incumbent and newcomer inventors do not work on the same patents, there
is still room for potential spillovers generated by the arrival of workers of different
nationality, experience and knowledge. Citation data have been used in the literature
to detect such effects (Hall et al., 2001). In my case, I expect incumbents to cite more
foreign patents as more H-1B workers enter the firm. For all the patents generated
by incumbents in the period 2001-2007, I construct a Herfindahl diversity index:

Hj = 1 −

X Cjk 2
k

Cj

where Cjk is the number of patents from country k cited by patent j and Cj is the
total number of citations made by patent j. The index has value 0 if all the cited
patents are from the same country and it increases as diversity grows. I identify the
location of the patent as the country of residence of the first inventor.
The regression model follows:

Hji,t



= f α + β1 log(LCAi,t ) + β2 log(PSi,t ) + β3 Selfj + δt + ηi + ji,t

where Hji,t is the diversity index of citations for patent j applied at time t by the
assignee i. Selfj is the ratio of self-citations, i.e citations to patents with the same
assignee, over total citations for patent j. Firms citing their own patents more often
are likely to have a lower diversity index so I want to control for this effect.
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Since the dependent variable is a ratio, the linear regression model is not the
best alternative. Hence, I apply the fractional logit model by Papke and Wooldridge
(1996) and I include the time average of log( H-1Bi,t ) and log(PSi,t ) to capture firm
fixed effects.
Similarly, I construct two other indices: one controlling the diversity of citations
by state (where, again, I assumed the state of residence of the first inventor as location
of the patent) and the other one controlling the diversity of citations by class. The
intuition is the same: if the new H-1B workers generate spillovers by bringing new
expertise, I should observe the citations of incumbent patents to be more disperse in
terms of state and class.

2.4

Results

Table 2.1 shows the results from the regression of patents over LCAs by firm. Looking
at the estimates from the log-log regression, in the first column, the coefficient of
log(LCAi,t ) is positive and significant: a 10% increase in the number of applications
for H-1B workers in STEM occupation generates a 0.6% increase in patents. The
results for the Poisson model, in the third column, and the Negative Binomial model,
in the fourth column, are similar.
The outcome from the 2SLS regression with the instrumental variable, in the
second column, shows a coefficient which is almost ten times larger than the previous
ones: a 10% increase in LCAs induces a 5% increase in patent activity. The instrument
is relevant as proved by the t-statistic of the first-stage regression equal to 2.07.
The sample reduces to 15% of the original one, losing all the firms for which we
don’t observe Asian inventors who patented between 1990 and 2000 but not after.
However, the coefficient remains highly significant and may capture even better the
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effect of new H-1B workers in the firm. Actually, the data about LCA include both
new issuance and renewal requests so the number of incoming foreign employees is
inflated. Moreover, the approval of the LCA is just the first step for obtaining H-1B
visa: we don’t observe the final outcome so again, the quantity of new H-1B workers
is higher than the real one. In sum, there is evidence of large measurement error
leading to the underestimation of the coefficient in the case where we don’t use the
instrumental variable.
Table 2.1: Impact of H-1B workers on patents by assignee

VARIABLES
log LCA STEM
log Patent Stock
Constant
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
Number of firms
R-squared
t-stat

(1)
log Patent

(2)
log Patent

(3)
Patent

(4)
Patent

(linear)

(with instr.)

(Poisson)

(Neg. Bin.)

0.062***
(0.0111)
0.069**
(0.0270)
2.044***
(0.0913)
Yes
Yes
16,569
6,844
0.082

0.560***
(0.1950)
0.360***
(0.0584)

0.071***
(0.0203)
0.245***
(0.0547)

Yes
Yes
4,160
848

Yes
Yes
22,696
5,381

0.053***
(0.0070)
0.347***
(0.0075)
-0.891***
(0.0375)
Yes
Yes
22,696
5,381

2.07

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.2 reports the outcome of the regression of new inventors over LCA by
firm. The coefficient supports the presence of market size effect: it is positive and
significant. According to the log-log regression without instrumental variable, a 10%
increase in H-1B workers gives rise to a 0.2% increase in the number of new inventors
in the following year. So, we observe firms who require more foreign employees today
hiring more inventors even tomorrow. The estimates are robust to the Poisson and
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Negative Binomial specification. As before, the coefficient in the 2SLS regression with
the instrumental variable is much higher: the same 10% increase in LCA corresponds
now to 4% more future inventors.
Table 2.2: Impact of H-1B workers on the number of new inventors

VARIABLES
log LCA STEM
log Patent Stock
Constant
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms
t-stat

(1)
log New Inv.

(2)
log New Inv.

(3)
New Inv.

(4)
New Inv.

(linear)

(with instr.)

(Poisson)

(Neg. Bin.)

0.024**
(0.0126)
0.042
(0.0255)
1.658***
(0.0933)
Yes
Yes
11,302
0.061
4,853

0.399**
(0.1880)
0.125**
(0.0607)

0.050**
(0.0197)
0.050
(0.0428)

Yes
Yes
3,322

Yes
Yes
16,031

0.051***
(0.0087)
0.306***
(0.0107)
-0.644***
(0.0541)
Yes
Yes
16,031

759
2.12

4,005

4,005

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Moving to the analysis about incumbent inventors, we can see from Table 2.3
that the probability of patenting again in the same firm in the subsequent years is
positively related to number of LCA. The coefficient is significant in both regressions,
with and without instrument.
H-1B workers have a positive impact on the patenting activity of incumbents also
at the intensive margin, as shown in Table 2.4. The first three columns are loglog regressions without instrument while the last three are with the instrument. In
general, a 10% increase in LCA translates into 0.2% more patents for incumbents
(0.4% if we consider the 2SLS regression outcome). Hence, there is enough evidence
supporting the complementarity between existing inventors and foreign newcomers.
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Table 2.3: Impact of H-1B workers on incumbent inventors (extensive margin)

VARIABLES
log LCA STEM
log Patent Stock
Inventor Age
Constant
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
Number of inventors
Number of firms

(1)

(2)
(with instr.)

0.035***
(0.0080)
-0.598***
(0.0265)
-0.0046***
(0.0016)
-0.633***
(0.0486)
Yes
Yes
506,515
239,249
6,072

0.344***
(0.0518)
-0.756***
(0.0508)
-0.0062***
(0.0020)
-3.748***
(0.1770)
Yes
Yes
391,764
174,673
934

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The distinction between escape competition and collaboration effect is harder to
detect. In the second column (fifth for the 2SLS regression), we can see the impact
of H-1B workers on the patents where the incumbent is the first inventor and doesn’t
have any new entry coauthor: a 10% growth in LCA brings in 0.12% (0.9% with the
instrument) more patents. In the third column (sixth for the 2SLS regression), we
observe the effect on the patents where the newcomer is the first inventor and the
incumbent is one of the subsequent: a 10% increase in foreign workers leads to 0.24%
(1.63% with the instrument) more patents. So, the estimates suggest the presence of
both the escape competition and the collaboration effect. The latter is larger than
the former but the difference is not significant.
Finally, we can turn to the citation analysis in Table 2.5. We can see that the
increase in LCA gives rise to a higher diversity index by country: the margin is really
small, a 10% rise corresponds to more 0.002 in the index, but it is significant at the
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10% level. We can’t say the same for the diversity index by state: in this case, the
effect is positive but not significant. Conversely, a 10% increase in H-1B applications
leads to a class diversity index higher by 0.003. Again, the effect is really small but
it is significant at the 1% level. So, we can conclude that incumbents working in
firms more dependent on H-1B visa cite patents more diverse in terms of country of
origin and class. This gives us some evidence of positive spillovers stemming from the
arrival of new foreign inventors.
Table 2.4: Impact of H-1B workers on incumbent inventors (intensive margin)

VARIABLES
log LCA STEM
log Patent Stock
Inventor Age
Constant
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared
N. inventors
N. firms

no instrument
(1)
(2)
(3)
log Patents First Inv. Sub. Inv.
0.019***
(0.0032)
-0.058***
(0.0105)
-0.070***
(0.0021)
0.148**
(0.0715)
Yes
Yes
252,080
0.037
129,142
7,042

0.012**
(0.0056)
0.078***
(0.0176)
-0.053***
(0.0036)
-0.888***
(0.1180)
Yes
Yes
111,358
0.009
64,687
6,732

0.024**
(0.0114)
-0.112***
(0.0313)
-0.0153**
(0.0068)
-0.318
(0.2090)
Yes
Yes
37,976
0.014
31,491
3,518

with instrument
(4)
(5)
(6)
log Patents First Inv.
Sub. Inv.
0.040*
(0.0215)
-0.034**
(0.0142)
-0.134***
(0.0083)
-0.057
(0.1220)
Yes
Yes
151,578
0.036
48,546
613

0.091***
(0.0313)
0.057**
(0.0231)
-0.049***
(0.0047)
-1.193***
(0.1860)
Yes
Yes
89,061

0.163**
(0.0714)
-0.141***
(0.0476)
-0.003
(0.0118)
-0.799**
(0.3820)
Yes
Yes
30,917

49,651
607

25,285
519

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.5

Conclusions

There has always been great debate about immigration policies. On August 2, 2017
the RAISE (Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment) Act was introduced in the United States Senate. The bill would not change the legislation with
regard to H-1B temporary visas. However, it would introduce a visa-point system for
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Table 2.5: Impact of H-1B workers on the diversity index of citations

VARIABLES
log LCA STEM
log Patent Stock
Self Citation Rate
Constant
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations

country index
(1)
(2)
coeff.
margins
0.006*
(0.0039)
0.003
(0.0094)
-0.446***
(0.015)
-0.518***
(0.0113)
Yes
Yes
191,024

0.002*
(0.0009)
0.001
(0.0022)
-0.106***
(0.004)

Yes
Yes
191,024

state index
(3)
(4)
coeff.
margins
0.002
(0.0040)
-0.031***
(0.0102)
0.569***
(0.020)
0.479***
(0.0119)
Yes
Yes
191,024

0.001
(0.0010)
-0.008***
(0.0026)
0.142***
(0.005)

Yes
Yes
191,024

class index
(5)
(6)
coeff.
margins
0.014***
(0.0043)
-0.052***
(0.0106)
0.325***
(0.018)
-0.024*
(0.0124)
Yes
Yes
191,024

0.004***
(0.0011)
-0.013***
(0.0026)
0.081***
(0.004)

Yes
Yes
191,024

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

employment-based permanent visas, which are the obvious solution for H-1B workers
willing to stay in the United States in the long term. Hence, the RAISE Act might
have some impact also in terms of high-skilled temporary workers.
The possible consequences for U.S. innovation are complex and cannot be inferred
by reduced-form specifications. However, the outcome of my empirical analysis offers
a valid baseline for a future model. Native and immigrant inventors appears to be
complementary to each other. The data support the hypothesis of market-size effect.
There is some evidence of both escape competition mechanism and positive spillovers.
All these results represent a good starting point for designing a model of endogenous
growth through which evaluate the economic impact of immigration policies.
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Chapter 3
Mass Attrition: An Analysis of
Drop Out from Principles of
Microeconomics MOOC29
3.1

Introduction

A Massive Open Online Course (or MOOC) is a course given over the web for free,
to anyone who is interested in signing up and has the basic technical capabilities to
do so. The movement started in 2008 and took off in 2012, dubbed by the New York
Times as The Year of the MOOC.30 Some large platforms include Coursera, Udacity
and edX. The potential of reaching a wide audience, both geographically and in terms
of interests and demographics, is exciting. The chance of offering a lower-cost method
of delivering education by the best professors and content creators is transformative
(Cowen and Tabarrok, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2014). MOOCs have already reached
millions of students, introducing them to topics as disperse as modern poetry and
introduction to artificial intelligence. Champions of the MOOC movement believe
that it will transform higher education in the USA by providing low cost alternatives
to college credits as well as open academic level education to millions around the
world. Some economists see them as direct competition to non-selective colleges
(Hoxby, 2014).
A typical MOOC is composed of three elements. First, there are a series of videos
29

Allione, G. and Stein, R. M. (2016). Mass attrition: An analysis of drop out from principles of
microeconomics MOOC, The Journal of Economic Education, 47(2), 174-186
30
Laura Pappano, “The year of the MOOC,” The New York Times, November 4, 2012.
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that substitute for the typical lecture. The recommendation is to keep each segment
short: 5-10 minutes each. The second element is composed of quizzes and/or problem
sets that allow students to evaluate their own understanding and demonstrate their
knowledge in order to receive recognition (for example, in the form of a certificate
of accomplishment). The third element is the discussion forum that allows students
to ask for help, on logistical, technology or content related issues, from peers and/or
instructors.
The University of Pennsylvania joined as a partner with Coursera in 2012 and our
nine-week course, Principles of Microeconomics, which took place during the spring of
2013, was one of the first courses to run as product of this partnership. As was typical
of the first generation of MOOCs, we mimicked, subject to a few modifications,31 a full
semester course in length and scope. The course had a firm start date and completion
date and though most of the work was asynchronous, students were expected to keep
to a weekly schedule in terms of assignments and deliverables. Each week included
4-15 lecture video segments and a quiz of ten multiple-choice questions. There were
six short answer assignments during the course and a multiple-choice final exam.
Students with a grade of at least 65% earned a certificate of completion and those
above 85% got one with distinction.
Taking a successful live course and translating it into the Mass Online Open environment is time consuming and challenging but overall rewarding. The lectures
are pedagogically the easiest part to shift online. In a large class32 there is minimal
interaction with individual students and thus for most students, even in entertaining
and engaging lectures, it is, at the core, a passive experience. Though easy to do ped31

Topics that were omitted included consumer theory and factor markets. This was primarily
done to keep the course in a nine week format which was set by the University.
32
The typical lecture in Principles of Microeconomics at the University of Pennsylvania has 150250 students. Students also attend a weekly recitation of 25 students led by a TA.
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agogically, the recordings require both good technical support (we had a designated
studio and editor) and a level of comfort talking to the camera and lecturing without
the feedback of a live audience. The process is extremely time consuming and exhausting: each hour recorded takes about 4 hours of preparation, retakes, corrections
etc. But, of course, this is a one-time fixed cost and future runs of the course will not
require re-lecturing as they do in a live setting.
The most difficult aspect of the live course to translate to the MOOC environment was the response, critique and provision of feedback on assessments. Following
the model developed in engineering and mathematics courses, we tried a variety of
methods. Each week we had a quiz compiled of ten multiple-choice questions. As
we were attempting to teach and not just evaluate, students were given feedback on
incorrect answers and had two attempts to submit the quiz. We also had a mix of
short answer assignments. Three were fill in the blank, mostly numeric, questions,
which were easy to administer and evaluate. Three included a graphical application
of the models to real world scenarios. To provide feedback and evaluation we chose
the peer assessment model, in which each student who submitted an assignment one
week, had to review, comment and evaluate five peer answers during the following
week. We had some very vocal participants complaining about the time and effort
this required, while other, more muted, voices thanked us for the high level of assessment and suggested that both completing the assignment and evaluating their peers
were helpful learning experiences.
On-line discussion forums were set up to allow for students interaction with the
instructors and with each other. This not only allows for timely communication on
logistical and content related issues but also builds a community of learners. Five
undergraduate economics students were hired to monitor the online forums, respond
and, as need be, alert the teaching team when content clarifications would be helpful.
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Each student checked into the site about one hour a day for the duration of the course.
Table 3.1 summarizes some basic course statistics that point to the stark difference
between enrollment in a MOOC and a traditional course. In terms of magnitude,
there were almost 36 thousand students enrolled. This size, typical of a MOOC, is
equivalent of enrolling a whole state university in one course concurrently. However,
enrollment numbers are misleading. Only 18 thousand students, one out of two
enrollees, logged in even once and only 15 thousand watched, at a minimum, part of
one lecture. Initial enrollment, in other words, is more akin to browsing a university
brochure than registering for a live semester in a campus setting. By the second week
only 6,486 students remained. 2,744 stayed to the end of the course and watched
the last video lecture in week nine. 866 students attempted the final exam. Only
740 earned a certificate of accomplishment, which is the recognition that a student
successfully mastered the material covered in the course.33
Table 3.1: Statistics on course activity

Activity

N. Participants

Enrolled in the course
Logged into the course at least once
Watched at least part of one video
Watched first video of the first week
Watched first video of the second week
Watched last video of the last week
Took the Final Exam
Earned the Statement of Accomplishment

35,819
18,009
15,427
13,483
6,486
2,744
886
740

This pattern of attrition is not unique to our course. It has been clear from the
start that though MOOCs enroll tens of thousands of students each, only a very small
fraction of them, between 5 and 12 percent, finishes the course and earns a certificate
33

472 students, out of 740 that passed the course, met the distinction criteria (score greater than
85%).
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of completion (Koller et al., 2013; Clow, 2013; Perna et al., 2014). In comparison,
for-credit academic online courses have retention rates between 88% (Xu and Jaggars,
2013) and 60% (Johnson and Cuellar Mejia, 2014). The summer online course taught
by Rebecca Stein at the University of Pennsylvania has a retention rate around 60%.
Critics of the MOOC movement cite the low retention rates as a sign of failure and
proof of MOOCs limited impact.34 As these courses are not given for credit, the
low completion rate is not surprising – after all, many people pick up a book at the
library and do not check it out, let alone read it or write a review of it. Koller et al.
(2013) explain that the variety of intents of online course takers is very different from
the traditional classroom model. In the MOOC framework, some students do indeed
plan on completing the course and can be referred to as “Committed Learners”.
However, others may just want to understand what the topic is about or find out
more about a particular professor or even about MOOCs as a whole. Those are
the so-called “Browsers”. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) note that attrition is larger for
students that enrolled one day late, compared to students who enrolled on time. They
interpret the result as an indication that less organized learners do worse in this new
environment. Jordan (2014) explores enrollment and completion rates of mass online
courses over the first 18 months of their existence and finds that though MOOCs size
did not change, the completion rates, in most cases defined by earning a certificate of
accomplishment, increased over this period (though the majority of them still have
completion rates below 10% with a median of 6.5%). Completion rates are negatively
correlated with course length and are lower when the course requires relatively more
assignments, especially if they involve programming or peer assessment exercises, as
indeed our course did.
34

Maria Konnikova, “Will MOOCs be flukes?” The New Yorker, November 7, 2014. http:
//www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/moocs-failure-solutions.
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We wanted to explore better the distinction between the Committed Learners
and Browsers and learn whether the patterns of engagement are set early on, so that
within a short period we can distinguish statistically between these two groups of
students. Students had the opportunity to engage in the course not only by watching
videos but also by participating in online forums (posting questions, responding to
other posts, voting on posts to move them up or down on a priority list), solving the
weekly quizzes and peer-assessed assignments, grading other students assignments
and taking the final exam. Table 3.2 summarizes course engagement data during the
first week of the course.
Table 3.2: Statistics on first-week activity

Activity

N. Participants

Watched the First Video in the First Week
Took First Quiz
Submitted First Peer Assessment
Graded First Peer Assessment (during 2nd week)
Participated in Forum Activity

13,483
4,571
1,860
1,457
684

Only about a third of the students who watched at least one video took the first
quiz and only 18% submitted the first peer assessment. As quizzes and assignments
were a major component of the grade in the course, failing to take these suggests
that most of the enrollees behaved as passive learners or auditors rather than the
fully engaged students we expect in a live, credit bearing course. In general, forcredit academic online courses perform worse than traditional courses in terms of
retention rates (Xu and Jaggars, 2013; Johnson and Cuellar Mejia, 2014). There is
an extensive literature studying the reasons behind this phenomenon (Hart, 2012).
Some of the factors mentioned in this literature as associated with persistence are
more easily applicable to the MOOC environment. These include general satisfaction
with online learning, motivation, time management skills and family support. Others
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may be more challenging to create in a MOOC, including peer support, the sense
of belonging to a learning community and increased communication with instructor.
Our study does not test these factors directly. However, we included a voluntary
opt-in survey that was available for completion throughout the course that collected
both demographic information as well as a question asking for the students initial
reason for taking this course.
As summarized in Table 3.3, out of the 3,215 students who submitted the survey,
65% percent were male and the predominant age group was 22-35 years old. Around
50% had taken a Coursera course before. Almost half of the participants were working
full time and the vast majority were participating in the course in addition to other
big time commitments such as studies, part time work etc. Students were also asked
the reason why they enrolled in this course. About 60% knew nothing or little about
Microeconomics and wanted to expand their knowledge. 25% of students chose to
enroll in the course because it would help them in their job or life skills. 11.5%
used the course as preparation for a future class in Microeconomics. Finally, 3.5%
of participants were specifically interested in taking a course with the University of
Pennsylvania and/or Rebecca Stein. Students represented 147 countries with the
largest five being United States, India, China, Brazil, Spain. In our tables, we divide
the countries into three categories: the USA, non-USA English speaking35 countries
and non-USA non-English speaking countries. We also matched each country with
GDP per capita,36 as a measure of economic development. Using the survey data, we
are able to highlight key demographic characteristics such as age, gender, country of
origin that are correlated with retention.
35

Defined as countries where English is one of the official languages. The World Factbook. Central
Intelligence Agency.
36
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). World Bank, International Comparison Program
Database.
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Table 3.3: Demographic data

Characteristic

Percentage

Gender
Male
Female
Total

65.07%
34.93%
100.00%

Coursera Experience
First time Coursera User
Experienced Coursera User
Total

49.11%
50.89%
100.00%

Country of Residence
USA
Non USA – English-speaking Country
Non USA – Non English-speaking Country
Total

23.64%
24.63%
51.73%
100.00%

Occupational Status
Student (pre-college)
Student (undergraduate)
Student (post-graduate)
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Self-employed
Unemployed
Other
Total

5.27%
16.74%
10.19%
46.82%
3.24%
7.54%
6.20%
3.99%
100.00%

Age
Under 18
18 - 21
22 - 35
36 - 50
51 - 70
71 90+
Total

4.00%
12.23%
56.52%
18.57%
7.99%
0.69%
100.00%

Reason for taking the course
Learn the principles of Microeconomics
Expand my knowledge about Microeconomics
Preparation for future course
Help with my job
Help with my life skills
Interested in a course with Penn and /or Rebecca Stein
Total
Source: Voluntary Survey (N = 3,215)
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23.06%
37.45%
11.39%
11.24%
13.39%
3.46%
100.00%

As we document in the results section, we find that those younger than 22 and
college students are more likely to abandon the course and those who are over 35 are
the most likely to stay. The strong correlation between age and retention is striking,
given that the course was designed for a younger audience in the choice of examples
and tone. This raises some doubts about the substitutability of MOOCs to more
guided, individualized, coursework that forms that backbone of both online and inclass teaching even at non-selective colleges. Female enrollees are more likely to drop
out as measured by video watching, though the difference is true mainly for full-time
worker females against their male counterparts. Participants from USA are more
likely to drop out. Retention is positively correlated with GDP per capita: it may
be that logistical and technical constraints, such as limited bandwidth, impede those
from poorer countries. Interestingly, among students who took the first quiz, neither
Coursera experience nor being male predicts retention. This suggests that submitting
the first quiz is a strong signal of commitment, since some of the differences between
categories found in video retention disappear when looking at quiz retention, at least
for those who took the survey.
As this is, to our knowledge, one of the first papers to attempt a sophisticated
statistical analysis of retention in MOOCs, we take care to explain some technical
issues regarding the Cox proportional hazard model, often used in duration analysis.
Though many of the details have been relegated to footnotes, we hope the brief
summary included here will be helpful to this developing literature. Full specifications
of all regressions are available from the authors.
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3.2

Model and Results

Compared to probability models, which focus on whether the event occurs, duration
models target the time at which the event would possibly occur. This is the appropriate framework for our research question since we are not only interested in whether
students finished the course but also in when they abandon it. Duration analysis
allows us to capture the entire path of retention and not only the final result. In this
way, we take full advantage of our individual level time-stamped data. In particular,
we chose the Cox proportional hazard model because it delivers results that are easy
to interpret.
The hazard rate is the probability of dropping out at time t conditional on surviving until that point. The proportionality assumes that there is an underlying baseline
probability λ0 (t) of dropping the course (due, for example, to random life events that
interrupt the students ability to continue) which is not directly affected by the independent variables. Rather, the impact of a unit increase in the independent variable
is multiplicative with respect to the hazard or dropout rate. The Cox proportional
hazard model has the form:
0

λ(t|X) = λ0 (t) exp(β1 X1 + · · · + βn Xn ) = λ0 (t) exp(β X)

for the hazard rate at time t and an individual covariate vector X. The independent variables in vector X, were taken to be either measures of course connectivity,
identified by the students activity during the first week of class, or demographic data.
As the name suggests, the Cox proportional hazard model assumes that the covariates affect dropout in a proportional manner that is time invariant. The proportionality assumption can be tested by regressing the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on
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functions of time. We can think of Schoenfeld residuals as the observed minus the
expected values of the covariates at each failure time. If the proportionality assumption holds, the slope of the Schoenfeld residuals with respect to time should not be
significantly different from zero. In cases where the zero-slope hypothesis is rejected,
the proportionality assumption does not hold so we adjust our model by including
the interaction term between the covariate and time.
We measure dropping out of the course in two ways: no longer watching videos,
conditional on having watched the first one, and no longer submitting quizzes, conditional on having taken the first one. Therefore, in the model the period n is the nth
video segment or the nth quiz. Obviously, the sample size in the latter specification
is smaller, since not all the students that watched the first video took the first quiz.
In all the tables below we provide the hazard ratio instead of the coefficient. For
example, a hazard ratio of 1.25 on the dummy variable “female” would suggest that
females are 25% more likely to drop out in any given period compared to males; a
hazard ratio of 0.7 would suggest that they are 30% less likely to drop out.
To see whether engagement during the first week impacts the hazard of dropping
out, we run a model where the independent variables are measures of the first week
activity, including quiz participation, completion of peer-assessed assignment and
participation in a forum. Table 3.4 summarizes the results of these specifications. We
reject the proportional hazard assumption37 so we provide both time invariant and
time variant coefficients.38
We can see that students taking the first quiz, whether or not they participated
37

The proportionality assumption is rejected with probability p < 0.01, χ2(5) = 662.52 in the
model of video retention while it holds in case of quiz retention, χ2(3) = 2.86. The test on each
separate covariate is consistent with the global test. Results are available from the authors.
38
We ran some robustness checks by including the survey participation indicator and the demographics variables. The coefficients on the first-week activity variables stay significant and qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 3.4: Video and quiz retention by first-week activity

Video
Video Only - Forum
Quiz1 - No PA1a - No Forum
Quiz1 - No PA1 - Forum
PA1 - No Forum
PA1 - Forum

(1)

(2)

1.278∗∗∗
(0.102)
0.690∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.689∗∗∗
(0.066)
0.359∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.320∗∗∗
(0.023)

1.043
(0.099)
0.502∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.520∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.207∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.169∗∗∗
(0.019)
1.019∗∗∗
(0.005)
1.021∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.019∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.027∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.029∗∗∗
(0.003)
13,483

(Video Only Forum) * Time
(Quiz1 - No PA1 - No Forum) * Time
(Quiz1 - No PA1 Forum) * Time
(PA1 - No Forum) * Time
(PA1 Forum) * Time
N.

Quiz

13,483

Notes: Hazard ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Omitted variables: Video Only - No Forum; Quiz1 - No PA1 - No Forum
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
a

Peer Assessment 1.
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(3)

(4)

0.908
(0.083)
0.384∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.338∗∗∗
(0.025)

0.945
(0.133)
0.411∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.328∗∗∗
(0.040)

4,571

0.979
(0.055)
0.972
(0.020)
1.007
(0.035)
4,571

in a forum, were about 30% less likely to drop the course compared to students who
only watched the videos during the first week. Students taking the first peer-assessed
assignment, whether or not they participated in a forum, were about 65% less likely
to drop the course compared to students who only watched the videos during the first
week. This suggests that participants in a MOOC belong indeed to different types
and that activity in the first few days indicates their commitment to the course. The
results are consistent with Banerjee and Duflo (2014) who find that students that
enroll one day late are 17% less likely to earn a certificate than students that enroll
on time, confirming that patterns of retention can be detected by early on behavior.
The hazard ratios in column (2) can be interpreted as follows: at the beginning of
the course, the students that took the first quiz (with no participation in the forum
and no peer assessment) were 50% less likely to drop out than those that only watched
the videos. However, the difference shrinks by 2.1% in each period. This suggests that
over time the first weeks activity loses its importance as an indicator of attachment
to the course, as we should expect since those least committed to the course have
dropped out.
Looking at participation in the online forum, we observe in column (1) that students who posted in the forum were 28% more likely to drop out of the course.
However, once we add time interactions, we see that this effect is mainly due to their
large drop off between the first and the second week. Why are these students, who
took the time to participate in the forum during the first week, dropping out of the
course is worth pursuing further. Our conjecture is that they used the forum to voice
their frustration about the platform or the peer assessment and thus their postings
and their defection are both expressions of the same barriers to learning. This pattern
recalls the distribution of online product reviews, observed by some studies: there is
a high concentration of reviews at the two extremes but very few in the middle (Hu
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et al., 2009; Li and Hitt, 2008).
We next turn to analyzing student characteristics using data from an opt-in survey.
Table 3.5 shows that survey participation is not random. Using the Cox proportional
hazard model, we see that in terms of video watching, students taking the survey are
27% less likely to drop the course in each given period, while they are 35% less likely
in terms of quiz completion. The same qualitative results still hold when we adjust
the model to include the time interaction term.39
Table 3.5: Video and quiz retention by survey participation

Survey = 1
N.

Video
(1)

Quiz
(2)

0.732∗∗∗
(0.017)
13,483

0.649∗∗∗
(0.022)
4,571

Notes: Hazard ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

There might be two possible reasons underlying the different behavior between
those who did and did not complete the survey. It is likely to reflect self-selection
of the more determined students into the set of survey takers, but it could also be
the result of an endowment effect created by the time cost of filling out the survey.
If indeed it is the act of engaging in this simple activity that reduces attrition, this
suggests that even small changes in the early interaction with the students could
greatly improve the effectiveness of MOOCs.
39

The proportional hazards assumption is rejected with probability p < 0.01 in both specifications.
χ (1) = 39.08 for video retention and χ2 (1) = 15.55 for quiz retention. Including the time interaction
term, we find that the gap between those taking the survey and those not taking the survey evolves
differently over time between the two measures of course retention. The difference shrinks by 0.6%
per video while it increases by 7% per quiz. We also ran some robustness checks by including the
first week activity variables. The coefficients show that participation in the survey predicts retention
for students who submitted the first quiz or peer assessment but it predicts attrition for those who
only watched videos in the first week. This confirms our hypothesis: students that did not actively
engage in the first week activities are browsers rather than committed learners and they might have
taken the survey for curiosity rather than commitment to the course.
2
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The selection issue involving the survey participation does not imply that the
demographic information is unusable; rather, we should understand that survey participants are positively self-selected so any result in this sense applies better to the
population of “Committed Learners” rather than “Browsers”.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 summarize the impact of demographic characteristics on the
hazard of dropping the course as measured by video watching.40 All tables include
prior Coursera experience, gender, whether the participant is from the USA or another English speaking country and GDP measures. Unfortunately, we do not have
the actual age values since students were only asked about their age range. In all specifications, the omitted age category is 22-35 and the omitted occupation is full-time
employment.
Students with Coursera experience are approximately 20% less likely to drop out.
Various reasons may drive this result. Some of the Coursera beginners probably
joined the course due to a curiosity towards the platform itself so their motivation
for completion was lower from the start. It is also possible that, using their past
experience, prior Coursera users tailor their expectations of the course leading to a
lower risk of disappointment. Females are 15% more likely to drop out. The literature
documents higher GPA and college completion among girls than boys overall (Di Prete
and Buchmann, 2013) but our results are of a specific course in economics, where
the gender gap is less surprising (Siegfried, 1979; Williams et al., 2014; Ballard and
Johnson, 2005). Our finding is robust to different specifications and we explore it
further below, trying to identify its underlining causes. In the United States, at the
time of the course, MOOCs were widely publicized in the popular press as well as in
the academic world. We conjecture that some of the enrollment by American students
40

There are very few cases where students took the survey but did not answer to all the questions.
The observation was dropped if the missing variable was part of the specification.
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Table 3.6: Video retention by demographics (focus on Reasons for taking the course)

Experienced Coursera =1
Female = 1
USA = 1
Non-USA English speaking = 1
log(GDP per capita)
log(GDP per capita)*Time
Learn the principles of Microeconomics
Preparation for future course
Help with my job
Help with my life skills
Interested in a course with Upenn/ Dr Stein
Age Dummies
Occupation Dummies
N.
Notes: Hazard ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Omitted variable: Expand my knowledge about Microeconomics
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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(1)

(2)

0.785∗∗∗
(0.032)
1.163∗∗∗
(0.050)
1.322∗∗∗
(0.077)
1.011
(0.053)
0.97
(0.033)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.067
(0.058)
0.961
(0.067)
0.931
(0.066)
1.066
(0.068)
1.077
(0.124)
No
No
3,176

0.807∗∗∗
(0.033)
1.154∗∗∗
(0.050)
1.368∗∗∗
(0.082)
1.04
(0.055)
0.998
(0.035)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.054
(0.058)
0.883∗
(0.063)
0.975
(0.070)
1.094
(0.071)
1.097
(0.126)
Yes
Yes
3,166

Table 3.7: Video retention by demographics (focus on Age and Occupation)

(1)
∗∗∗

Experienced Coursera =1

0.805
(0.033)
1.136∗∗∗
(0.049)
1.354∗∗∗
(0.08)
1.021
(0.054)
1.021
(0.054)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.328∗∗∗
(0.135)
1.314∗∗∗
(0.082)
0.826∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.862∗
(0.071)
1.008
(0.241)

Female = 1
USA = 1
Non-USA English speaking = 1
log(GDP per capita)
log(GDP per capita)*Time
Under 18
18-21
36-50
51-70
71-90+
Student Pre-College
Student Undergraduate
Student Graduate
Employed Part-Time
Self-Employed
Unemployed
Other
Reasons for taking the course Dummies
N.

Yes
3,170

(2)
∗∗∗

0.801
(0.033)
1.161∗∗∗
(0.05)
1.365∗∗∗
(0.081)
1.039
(0.055)
1.039
(0.055)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.001)

1.411∗∗∗
(0.129)
1.337∗∗∗
(0.078)
0.995
(0.072)
0.945
(0.112)
0.916
(0.076)
0.885
(0.08)
0.712∗∗∗
(0.084)
Yes
3,171

Notes: Hazard ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Omitted age variable: 22-35. Omitted occupation variable: Employed Full-Time
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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(3)
0.807∗∗∗
(0.033)
1.154∗∗∗
(0.05)
1.368∗∗∗
(0.082)
1.040
(0.055)
1.040
(0.055)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.005
(0.176)
1.077
(0.096)
0.844∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.921
(0.078)
1.369
(0.352)
1.316∗
(0.212)
1.229∗∗
(0.099)
0.959
(0.07)
0.947
(0.112)
0.946
(0.08)
0.880
(0.08)
0.672∗∗∗
(0.086)
Yes
3,166

was to explore the MOOC phenomenon rather than to sample a specific course, so
we expect attrition to be higher for this sub-sample. Indeed, participants from the
USA are 30% more likely to quit the course. This fact is not driven by language
because there is no significant difference between English vs non-English speakers
among non-USA participants. A selection story is consistent with the USA hazard
ratio. Non-American people are less exposed to advertising and information about
Coursera, so gaining knowledge of the course required a greater search effort, justified
by stronger motivation. In other words, it is reasonable to expect positive selection
from other countries and thus a higher dropout rate from USA participants. On the
other hand, we also need to take into account the presence of closer substitutes to
Coursera in the USA than in the rest of the world. For example, American college
students may attend a similar Microeconomics course in their own university but the
same cannot be said of other countries.41 This consideration leads us to include GDP
per capita, in logarithmic term, in the regression. If the previous statement about
substitutability holds, we would expect enrollees from poorer countries, where highquality tertiary education is more scarce,42 to stay longer in the course. As GDP per
capita fails the proportionality test,43 we include a time interaction on this variable.
We find that as the course unfolded, participants from poorer countries became more
and more likely to drop out. This suggests that factors such as technological gap, for
example the speed of broadband connection, or income constraints come into play
and prevail over the benefits that the course provides to participants of low GDP
countries as a unique opportunity to access high-level tertiary education.
41

In a separate specification, we included interactions between the USA dummy and other categories. We found that young students from the USA are extremely likely to drop out and they are
the ones driving the result on the pooled coefficients.
42
The Social Progress Index 2015, created by the nonprofit organization Social Progress Imperative, shows that access to advanced education is highly correlated with GDP per capita.
43
The proportional hazard assumption is rejected with probability p < 0.05, χ2 (1) = 4.30.
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In Table 3.6 we explore whether the different reasons to take the course have any
impact on retention. We run two specifications: one including age and occupation
dummies and one without. Without adjusting for age and occupation we find that
none of the reasons are associated with retention in a statistically significant way.
Once we include age and occupation dummies, those taking the class as “Preparation
for a future Microeconomics course” are 11.5% less likely to drop out in any period
than those taking the class to “Expand their knowledge about Microeconomics”. The
result does not hold in the previous specification because most of the students in this
category are under 21 and, as shown later, younger participants are, on average, more
likely to drop out. In both cases, the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that all
motivation categories have a coefficient equal to zero.44
In Table 3.7 we explore more carefully the impact of age and occupation. Because
age and occupation categories tend to overlap, we run three separate specifications.
(1) includes only the age categories, (2) only occupations and (3) both age and occupation categories. In each case the omitted age category is 22-35 and the omitted
occupation is full-time employment. All the specifications still include the reasons to
take the course as dummy variables, but the coefficients are not reported for sake of
brevity.
We find that younger participants (specification 1) and those who are full time
pre-college or undergraduate students (specification 2) are more likely to drop out.
The likelihood to stick with the course is increasing with age. Those between the ages
of 36 and 50 are 14% more likely to continue in any given period compared to those
22-35, while those younger than 22 are about 30% less likely to. Once we include both
age and occupation dummies in the same regression (specification 3), the coefficients
for the age category “Under 18” and “18-21” lose statistical significance. This is not
44

χ2 (5) = 5.47 for column 1 and χ2 (5) = 8.66 for column 2.
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surprising since they highly overlaps with Student Pre College and Student Undergraduate category respectively. The joint test rejects the null hypothesis, confirming
our intuition.45 Despite the fact that Principle of Microeconomics MOOC was closely
structured on a successful campus course aimed at mostly freshman 18-year-old students, these age and occupational groups were precisely those least likely to stay in
the course. Two reasons could explain this outcome: either this group starts off inherently less motivated, since they have access to their own college classes, or they need
the support of the on-campus environment, both socially and pedagogically, more
than other groups. If the latter is true, then the online MOOC structure may not
be a substitute for in-class teaching, at least for this age category and for those with
little college experience. It would be interesting to learn if these results change when
allowing the Coursera certificate of completion to fulfill a college credit requirement.
We explore the gender issue in two directions: self-ascribed reason to take the
course and occupation.46 We find that the gender gap disappears in the subsample
of students who enrolled because they wanted to take a course with a University of
Pennsylvania faculty member or Dr Stein in particular. The outcome suggests that it
is motivational for women to take a class taught by a female instructor. Clearly, this
study cannot entirely validate the above hypothesis since it refers to a single course.
However, it is an idea worth pursuing in a future work that analyzes multiple courses.
The factor playing the most important role in the gender gap is occupation. This
is not surprising: womens time commitment is very different from men. Comparing
occupations within gender, we find that female graduate students, part-time workers
and unemployed women are respectively 9%, 13% and 12% less likely to drop out
45

The null hypothesis is rejected with p < 0.05 for “Under 18” joint with “Student Pre-College”
and with p < 0.01 for “18-21” joint with “Student Undergraduate”. χ2 (2) = 8.56 and χ2 (2) = 18.16
respectively.
46
For sake of brevity, we do not report here the entire results but they are available from the
authors upon request.
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than female full-time workers.47 However, these differences are not significant for
male students. This is consistent with full-time working females having more time
constraints than male counterparts: for the former adding an on-line course is a bigger
challenge than for the latter.
Table 3.8 shows the results from a specification identical to Table 3.7, except that
the dependent variable is quiz retention.48 Since many of the coefficients that were
significantly different from zero for video retention are not for quiz retention, taking
the first quiz appears to be a strong signal of commitment to the course. Specifically,
the coefficient on females is no longer statistically significant, suggesting that female
students who engaged in the first quiz are not different from their male counterparts.
Still, participants from the USA and the young are more likely to drop out as are, in
this case, the very old.

3.3

Conclusions

What sets a MOOC apart from a textbook, beyond its being available online for free
and the extensive use of videos, are two important aspects. One is the existence
of clear deadlines and deliverable assignments; the second is the sense of community
built both through the forums and via the knowledge that a set of students is working
on a joint schedule. There is a natural tension between making MOOCs flexible and
self-paced and building into them structure and a sense of community of learners.
The more flexible is the course, the more the sense of community and the power of
setting deadlines and short-term goals are in danger of being lost. There is room
47

All the coefficients are statistically different from zero: the null hypothesis is rejected with
p < 0.1 for Graduate Student and Part Time Worker females and with p < 0.05 for Unemployed
females.
48
We looked at the reasons for taking the course but none of the categories is statistically significant
and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of all the coefficients being equal to zero. χ2 (5) = 1.31.
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Table 3.8: Quiz retention by demographics (focus on Age and Occupation)

Experienced Coursera =1
Female = 1
USA = 1
Non-USA English speaking = 1
log(GDP per capita)
log(GDP per capita)*Time
Under 18
18-21
36-50
51-70
71-90+

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.940
(0.051)
1.073
(0.061)
1.311∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.960
(0.066)
0.977
(0.052)
0.972∗
(0.016)
1.180
(0.160)
1.260∗∗∗
(0.103)
0.934
(0.069)
0.912
(0.098)
1.450
(0.445)

0.944
(0.051)
1.089
(0.062)
1.308∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.979
(0.068)
0.977
(0.052)
0.972∗
(0.016)
0.000

0.947
(0.051)
1.090
(0.063)
1.302∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.972
(0.067)
0.981
(0.052)
0.972∗
(0.016)
0.959
(0.220)
1.154
(0.138)
0.947
(0.072)
0.976
(0.108)
2.087∗∗
(0.690)
1.202
(0.254)
1.037
(0.112)
0.903
(0.088)
1.012
(0.157)
0.839
(0.094)
0.855
(0.099)
0.629∗∗∗
(0.100)
Yes
1,986

Student Pre-College
Student Undergraduate
Student Graduate
Employed Part-Time
Self-Employed
Unemployed
Other
Reasons for taking the course Dummies
N.

Yes
1,988

1.241∗
(0.149)
1.145∗
(0.088)
0.919
(0.089)
1.012
(0.157)
0.834∗
(0.092)
0.860
(0.100)
0.705∗∗
(0.102)
Yes
1,991

Notes: Hazard ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Omitted age variable: 22-35. Omitted occupation variable: Employed Full-Time
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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for significant experimentation with course design in this new format to explore this
tension. Students who need more flexibility and those who are good self-paced learners
will benefit from less structure. On the other hand, many of us are familiar with
the role deadlines and deliverables have in motivating us to complete tasks. The
demographic data in our paper suggests that such a tension exists in the MOOC
format too. As a whole, females in our course were more likely to drop out than males,
but among them, those part-time workers were more likely to complete the course than
full-time workers. This indicates that firm deadlines may be a problem if other aspects
in ones life, such as a full-time job and family care, are nonnegotiable. However, it is
not clear if more flexibility for the full-time workers, through, for example, self-paced
modules, would assist completion or reduce the student motivation to reach the end,
by undermining the same structure that is now the core strength of the course. We
also found that young participants and those attending college were more likely to
drop out. As the course was given in April through May, this could be due to a time
conflict with other coursework or it could reflect young learners being more motivated
by incentives such as course credit, which at this point was not given. However,
another possibility is that young audiences are less skilled as independent learners
and this group may need more individualized support. If the first two explanations
are correct, MOOCs are far more likely to grow to be a core component of higher
education than if the latter holds.
Any suggested changes should be focused on a well-defined target audience. As
previous papers have documented, there are two groups of MOOC users, Committed
Learners and Browsers, with different needs. To the extent that we see MOOCs as
a Free Library, allowing browsing is efficient, as the marginal cost of the additional
user is zero. But the fixed costs of setting up a MOOC are large. If one believes
that the core benefits go to the Committed Learners, one needs to explore methods
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that keep these students engaged. First week activities that create a self-selection
between motivated and less motivated learners allow us to focus on those most likely
to complete and any evaluation of new course structure, such as increased flexibility,
should be limited to and conditional on this group. This is an especially reasonable
strategy if we believe that learning is a result of active engagement with the topic
through a process of answering questions, making mistakes, getting feedback (be it
either automatic or from peers). Watching videos is not tantamount to learning
material and we may not want to focus on students who only engage at that level.
As Cowen and Tabarrok (2014) hypothesized, the large market size of MOOCs
gives strong incentives for innovation and quality improvements. Though the course
analyzed in this paper was given only a couple of years ago, the MOOC platform is
already changing, in part to alleviate the low retention issues. For example, some
Coursera courses are now given on an on demand schedule, so that students can start
them at any given date and take them in shorter modules.49 It will be interesting
to see if the demographic effects, such as the lower retention rates among females
and young participants, will stay the same in shorter, on-demand, courses. This new
and fast evolving teaching platform is an opportunity to reach a wide audience and a
better understanding of its strengths and limitations will help MOOCs achieve their
full potential.

49

“The Hype is Dead, but MOOCs Are Marching On.”
Knowledge@Wharton,
January 5,
2015.
Available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/
moocs-making-progress-hype-died/
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1

On multiple migration opportunities

The estimation procedure I use implicitly assumes that each individual gets only
one chance of migrating over his entire life. In case of future opportunities, the
assumption is irrelevant since I am not interested in workers migrating after 2003.
For past opportunities, the issue is more sensitive because, if the worker migrates, his
home country past wages enter the moment function and they need to be consistent
with the assumption that he didn’t migrate before. I correct for the possible bias as
follows.
1. In each period, I compute the probability of receiving a US job offer or winning
the diversity lottery conditional on not having migrated:
P (EB|stay, Ω) =

(1 − P (accept US job offer|Ω)) · p(S, a)
P (stay|Ω)

P (DV |stay, Ω) =

(1 − P (apply DV lottery|Ω) · q(S, a) · (1 − p(S, a))
P (stay|Ω)

P (stay|Ω) = (1 − P (accept US job offer|Ω)) · p(S, a)
+ (1 − P (apply DV lottery|Ω) · q(S, a) · (1 − p(S, a))
+ (1 − p(S, a)) · (1 − q(S, a))
2. Then, I define the pool of workers that can be tempted to migrate, i.e. that will
receive their chance of migrating in one of the subsequent periods. For them,
I simulate the arrival of a US job offer or the winning of the diversity lottery,
according to the above conditional probabilities.
3. I simulate the migration shock and, in case of a US job offer, the US income
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shock. I draw the home-country income shock from the normal distribution,
truncated from below at X where



−∞


X = X EB



X DV

no migration opportunities
US job offer
DV lottery winning

and X EB and X DV are the respective thresholds for the home country income
shock above which the worker decides to not migrate.
In this way, home country wages are consistent with the assumption that current
potential migrants have not already migrated.
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